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Introduction1
Several markets have emerged in which consumers and sellers interact and make transac-
tions through an intermediary or platform. Examples include smart phones, bank cards,
game consoles, shopping centers but even airports. The peculiarity of these markets is
that the actors join them because the platforms have a large number of members of
either their own or the other segment. Such markets are referred to in the literature as
two-sided markets, which, through the development of technology, have now appeared
in many forms in our daily lives. Although the analysis of two-sided markets is already
extensive, it still has unexplored areas. In addition, due to their different functioning
from traditional markets, they are also of great interest from a regulatory point of view,
whereas the impact of the regulatory tools used may be different and may be particularly
harmful in some cases. The chapters in this thesis contribute to a better understanding
of two-sided markets.
In the dissertation, first, two-sided markets are presented with the help of the
literature. In this context, the characteristics of those are described that distinguish
them from traditional markets. The means are also summarized used to analyze them
and the key findings are presented. Next, models will be described that focus on neglected
areas in two-sided markets, place issues that have already been examined in a different
context, or offer an explanation for current phenomena.
The results presented in the different chapters are not closely related, so they can
be interpreted independently. Therefore, at the beginning of each chapter, the analyzed
problem, its justification, as well as a summary of the relevant literature are covered.
In each chapter, duopolistic models are presented to determine the impact of platforms’
product differentiation decisions, the use of public and private contracts, and the entry of
the state in the market on optimal pricing. Because consumers typically do not consider
when purchasing a platform’s product or service that they will later purchase compatible
products, they do not internalize the benefits of their future consumption, so the models
1The present dissertation is the outcome of the project „From Talent to Young Researcher project
aimed at activities supporting the research career model in higher education”, identifier EFOP-3.6.3-
VEKOP-16-2017-00007 co-supported by the European Union, Hungary and the European Social Fund
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presented are sequential in nature. To analyze these and determine their equilibrium, the
tools of game theory are used. Depending on the type of model, the aim is to determine
the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium or the symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
The aim of Chapter 1 is to define two-sided markets, present their importance, and
highlight their distinctive features from traditional markets. In this chapter, the theory
of externalities and multi-product pricing are briefly summarized, as these form the basis
of the analysis of two-sided markets. However, a review of the literature reveals that
none of the theories can be applied independently in the study of two-sided markets, as
the pricing of platforms and the behavior of players are different from those observed in
traditional markets. In the case of platforms, most of the controversy has been triggered
by their pricing. In this chapter, the main features of this phenomenon are reviewed and
the results of empirical studies are presented that examined the pricing of the platforms
in the most typical two-sided markets. Finally, examples are provided of why it is still a
challenge to regulate platforms to this day.
In Chapter 2, the platforms’ decision on product differentiation and its impact on
pricing are examined. When it comes to products, one of the most important issues which
companies have to decide is how to differentiate their products. The more differentiated
a product is, the better it meets consumer tastes, and the higher is the demand for
it. In the literature, product differentiation is typically determined by the location
decision of the companies, one can think of models of Hotelling (1929) or Salop (1979).
However, this is not captured by the usual location decision, but, according to von Ungern-
Sternberg (1988), by the ability to influence travel cost. The idea behind this is that, in
practice, product differentiation is not achieved through a well-chosen location. Rather,
by designing the product or service in such a way that it can satisfy as many needs
as possible, it can also meet a more specific goal. Thus, if products are differentiated,
the consumer suffers a much smaller loss of utility than if they serve a more general
purpose. Furthermore, instead of symmetric network effect, an asymmetric network effect
is assumed. That is, on the consumer side, their own segment, while on the sellers’ side,
the size of the other segment increases the amount of realizable utility. It is concluded
that profit-maximizing platforms offer either full customizability to their consumers, but
therefore charge a positive price, or limited customizability but at a zero price. An
example of this can be found in everyday life, such as anti-virus software used on personal
computers. If the consumer is unwilling to pay for the anti-virus software, the free version
provides basic protection. While subscribing to its use, it provides complete protection
and entitles to additional services from the manufacturer. In the light of the above, it is
argued that in two-sided markets, it is not necessarily a problem for a platform to have
a large market share in one segment, provided that it has to compete for subscribers on
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the other side. Based on the results, the competition on one side will automatically spill
over to the other side, and if not in the prices charged, it will feel its impact in a different
dimension.
Next, in Chapter 3, the impact of observable and unobservable contracts applied
in two-sided markets are examined. The literature typically assumes public contracts
in the analysis, the examination of private contracts rather neglected. These appear
only as an alternative strategy, but their effects have not been incorporated into the
models until the paper of Llanes and Ruiz-Aliseda (2015). Under the assumption of a
monopolistic platform, the authors analyzed the effect of the above two contract types on
equilibrium. However, to the best of our knowledge, a similar attempt has not yet been
made for competing platforms. Thus, in the framework of this chapter, the use of public
and private contracts are analyzed in a duopolistic environment, their impact on pricing,
and sellers’ decision to join. On the one hand, it is confirmed that platforms change their
optimal strategy even in the event of competition, as long as they have the opportunity to
offer private contracts to sellers and set a high price for the previously supported segment.
As a result of private contracts, sellers set a collusive price for their products. This is
consistent with the findings of Armstrong and Wright (2007) and Llanes and Ruiz-Aliseda
(2015). On the consumer side, on the other hand, in contrast to the results of the above
two papers, the platforms do not offer discounts but continue to set a positive subscription
fee. However, this is lower for private contracts than for public contracts, and the increase
in network effect reduces the subscription fee charged to consumers, while it increases it
for public contracts. The results also highlight that the use of public contracts is preferred
for platforms, while for consumers, a different outcome may occur depending on the travel
cost. It is also shown that platforms offer sellers contracts that they can attract as many
of them as possible.
In many markets, it is common for the state to intervene by setting up a company.
Two-sided markets are no exception: the most typical example is the media market. In
Chapter 4, two-sided markets operating as a mixed duopoly are the subject of this study.
The answer to the question of how the product differentiation and pricing will be decided
in the case of competition between a public firm and a privately-owned platform is looked
for. This is justified by the fact that there have already been several attempts in the
European Union to ban advertising on state TV broadcasts. However, this makes the
state platform inaccessible to one side, and thus essentially ceases to be a platform and
continues to operate as a normal company. The results show that if the state appears
with a company in a two-sided market, it does not influence its competitor’s decision to
differentiate products. Conversely, on the side of the segment in which the public firm
and the private platform compete, the platform approximates the price charged to that
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of its competitor, while it imposes a monopolistic price on the other segment. Based on
the results, the regulation of such markets can be achieved either by applying regulatory
tools (tax, price regulation, competition law) or by establishing a state-owned platform.
Summarizing the results of the dissertation, it was found that as a result of product
differentiation, in the case of two-sided markets, the competition on one side spills over
to the other side, and if not in prices, it has an effect in another dimension. So it is not
necessarily a problem if the platforms do not compete with each other in one segment.
In the case of competition, the use of private contracts does not result in a change in
pricing strategy on the part of the platforms on the consumer side, but on the seller side.
Overall, based on the results, the platforms are encouraged to use public contracts, and
the use of private contracts may be encouraged by factors not examined in the model
(such as product differentiation, increasing market power). The state can act effectively
in a two-sided market if it creates a state platform: if one side is banned from a state






With the development of technology and the spread of the Internet, a new type of market
has become the focus of economic research. In these markets, two well-separable segments,
typically sellers and buyers, could meet and interact with each other through one or more
intermediaries or platforms. The interesting thing about these platforms is that they only
attribute value to users if another type of consumer also uses them.
For example, one can think of an online auction portal that is only attractive to
buyers if sellers are also present on that portal. However, sellers are only willing to join
a given portal if that is able to attract potential buyers. If a portal fails for one segment,
it has no value to the other. Credit cards can also be used as an example. The consumer
is willing to use a particular type of credit card if it is accepted by a large number of
stores, but it is only worthwhile for stores to accept credit cards that are used by many
consumers. In addition to the above, there are many other examples of products and
services, the consumption of which will only bring any benefits to consumers if it is used
by two separate consumer groups at the same time. These are, without claiming to be
exhaustive: game consoles (players – game developers), social media (users – advertisers),
newspapers (readers – advertisers), even malls (buyers – sellers), entertainment venues
(men – women) but also airports (passengers – airlines). The market of such products
and services is generally called two-sided markets.
Two-sided markets, as the examples above show, are not necessarily new, but there
is no doubt that, as a result of technical progress, a number of new products and services
are emerging to this day for which the service provider acts as an intermediary and the
market is two-sided.
One of the characteristics of two-sided markets, also known as platforms, is that
they serve two well-separable consumer segments. While this is a necessary but not
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sufficient condition for defining two-sided markets, as buyers and sellers are present in
each market. Tirole and Rochet (2004) pointed out that in the case of two-sided markets,
there is a non-internalized externality between the two segments, and that elements of
multi-product pricing theory also emerge in their operation. In other words, in two-sided
markets, the demand of one segment depends on the size of the other segment. Let us
look again at the example of online auction portals. Buyers of a given portal benefit from
finding themselves with a large number of sellers on the platform, while sellers are more
attracted to the portal’s service if they can interact with more potential buyers there.
Magazines are typically mentioned for negative externalities. Readers buy the magazine
because of the content, so the more ads placed in them, the more harmful it is to them.
In contrast, the more readers the magazine has, the more attractive it is to the advertiser
side. The theory of multi-product pricing is reflected in the price structure. In the case
of two-sided markets, the price structure is less distorted by market forces than by price
levels. However, in multi-product pricing, externalities are internalized in the purchase,
so the case of two-sided markets cannot be modeled purely using this theory.
In the following, first, the theory of externalities, as well as multi-product pricing,
are reviewed, and then the pricing characteristics of two-sided markets are described.
Then some empirical research is presented that has examined the most typical two-sided
markets. At the end of the chapter, examples of the regulation of two-sided markets are
provided from recent years, highlighting that there is currently no uniform methodology
for regulating two-sided markets.
1.2 Externalities, network effects, and network exter-
nalities
An externality or external economic effect exists in a given market if the activity of one
actor influences the decision of another actor and these effects are not internalized under
normal market conditions.1
Externalities can be grouped in two ways: according to whether the activity affected
the activity of a consumer (consumption) or a company (production), and according to
whether it had a positive or negative effect. So if externalities prevail in the market, then
market mechanisms do not result in a Pareto-efficient distribution.2 The problem is that
ownership rights are poorly defined, so the Coase theorem, that is, if ownership rights are
completely clear and enforceable and transaction costs are absent or negligible, then then
the negotiations of the contracting parties lead to the same allocation result, regardless
1Varian (2010, p. 644.)
2Varian (2010, p. 645.)
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of the original assignment of ownership rights, therefore, the problems of externalities
can be solved by voluntarily changing property rights3, is damaged. The internalization
of externalities requires intervention in the functioning of the market: for example, a
Pigouvian tax may be introduced by the state (the most typical example is emissions
taxation), or redistribution of property rights should be allowed (such as mergers, state
settlement of property rights ).4
In connection with the theory of externalities, the phenomenon of the network effect
and network externality must also be addressed. These are often used as synonyms,
although the underlying concept is different.
A network effect is a phenomenon where an increase in the number of participants
increases or occasionally decreases the value of a particular product or service. The
network effect, depending on its nature, therefore increases or decreases, on the one hand,
the benefits of those already on the market, while for other consumers it increases or
decreases the willingness to join. The most typical example of a positive network effect
is social media: the more members a social site has, the higher the willingness to join of
a new user, while those already in it benefit from expanding content due to the growing
number of users. But phones can also be mentioned, especially smartphones, which can
be considered platforms in two ways. On the one hand, in terms of the call origination and
call reception segment, and on the other hand, in terms of the user and the programmer.
The more people have a smartphone, the more people can call each other, and with the
same service provider, they can do so at a discount. While the more applications can be
downloaded to a phone, the more popular it is with customers, and the more people buy
the phone, the more programmers will create compatible applications with them.
There are two types of network effects in the literature5: direct and indirect network
effects. The direct network effect arises from the possession of the given product, while the
source of the indirect network effect can be, for example, easier availability or lower price
of additional products or an increase in the number of users. Staying with the example
above, the direct network effect for the customer stems from owning the phone, while the
phone case, headset, and also, as explained above, how many acquaintances you can call
through it generate an indirect network effect.6
Thus, a network effect is when market participants are able to internalize in some
way their additional benefits or costs generated by the activity of the other player. If a
network effect cannot be internalized by any of the actors, then we can talk about network
3Coase (1960)
4Varian (2010, pp. 644-666)
5See for example Liebowitz and Margolis (1998)
6Liebowitz and Margolis (1998) mention fax as an example. Owning the fax machine itself generates
benefits (direct) while increasing the number of users and the number of ancillary products such as the
toner cartridge generates additional benefits (indirect).
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externality.
However, with the emergence of two-sided markets, a special network effect emerged
that differed from those identified by previous theory. The paper by Weitzel et al. (2000),
in which the problem of positive network effect appears for the first time, is noteworthy7.
The authors start from the anomaly that in some markets, contrary to the conclusions of
the previous theory, it is not the consumer’s purchasing decision that determines others,
but how many people have already bought a given product. They state that in some
markets, demand-side economies of scale can be identified, stemming from the need for
product compatibility. As a result, markets also emerge where
1. despite the strong network effect, several different products are available, while
according to the previously developed theory, a monopolistic situation would be
optimal in this case;
2. even in a competitive market, small but stable consumer groups are created that
use a particular solution;
3. in the case of communication networks, strong actors force other actors to use a
particular solution.
The theory of network effect did not provide a proper explanation for the phenomena
listed above.
The authors review the previous theory of network effect and reveal several shortco-
mings that may lie behind them:
1. Direct and indirect network effect: The direct and indirect network effect is
evaluated differently by the actors, and it is also influenced by the nature of the
product generating the network effect. In contrast, this difference does not appear
in the models.
2. Network effect and network externality: In many cases, the creators of the
models do not take into account that although the actor connected to the network
does not internalize the benefits it generates, the owner of the network can do so.
Thus, the existence of a network effect does not necessarily lead to market failure.
3. The bigger the better: The existence of an indefinitely increasing positive network
effect, according to the literature, results in the formation of natural monopolies.
Conversely, if the network effect can be exhausted, multiple networks can coexist.
7The authors mention the information and communication market as an example, which in many
cases can be considered a two-sided market, however, the actual emergence of two-sided markets did not
take place until years later, here they only appeared tangentially.
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4. Homogeneous network effect: A common simplification in modeling is that
actors evaluate the network as well as the resulting network effect in the same way.
5. Cost due to network size: The basic hypothesis that, in addition to network
externalities, the optimal network is monopolistic, is only valid if a new member is
involved at a constant or decreasing (average) cost.
6. The problem of centralized or decentralized decision-making: Different
institutional backgrounds may lead to different standardization cases, which affects
the results obtained.
7. Normative implications: The purpose of the models is to be able to draw
normative conclusions from them, which has resulted in differing views in the
literature as to whether or not there is a need for state intervention in markets
characterized by network effects.
Weitzel et al. (2000) believe that the solution may be to develop models that
• are able to handle knowledge and uncertainty / limited rationality;
• follow evolutionary system dynamics (using empirical and simulation approaches);
• display system components and connections;
• reject the conditions of convexity and divisibility;
• intermediaries appear in them.
With the emergence of the theory of two-sided markets, more and more researchers have
undertaken to develop models that meet the above criteria.
Another grouping of network effects has also emerged with two-sided markets8: the
phenomenon of symmetric and asymmetric network effects. In the case of the former, the
benefit of both sides is influenced by the number of members of the other segment, i.e.
an inter-group network effect prevails. In contrast, in the case of the latter, the benefit
of one segment depends on the number of members in its own segment, i.e. on one side,
there is an intra-group network effect.
1.3 Multi-product pricing, price structures
Closely related to externalities is the problem of pricing for multi-product companies.
In this case, a company manufactures and sells two or more types of products, but this
8See for example, Bakó and Fátay (2018)
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also includes the case where one company manufactures a particular basic product, while
other companies produce accessories that can be used for that basic product. In these
cases, it is not the price of a particular product that the company needs to determine, but
the appropriate structure of relative prices to achieve maximum profit. The peculiarity of
these products is that the price of one product affects the demand for the other product.
Products can be complements or substitutes, and the effect of prices on demand varies
depending on the relationship.
The principles of optimal pricing of multi-product monopolies were first described by
Ramsey (1927). Although the paper is basically about optimal taxation, the generalization
of the results reported in it is in line with the trends observed in the practice of multi-
product pricing. Ramsey’s basic idea was that, with increasing returns, pricing based on
the marginal cost will generate a loss, since the marginal cost, in this case, is less than the
average cost. The above phenomenon justifies the practice of applying a margin, however,
the optimal distribution of this margin among products depends on the price elasticity of
their demand. This relationship is described by the inverse elasticity rule, which states
that the Lerner index of a given product, i.e. the difference between price and marginal
cost on price, is inversely proportional to the price elasticity of demand for products. In
the case of multi-product pricing, this correlation is supplemented by an adjustment term
that embodies the relationship between the two products.
Two typical textbook cases of multi-product pricing (see Tirole , 1994 or Belleflamme
and Peitz , 2015) when demand is related but costs are separable, and when demand is
independent, costs are, on the other hand, related. In the first case, as a result of the





















j are the marginal costs of the
two products, ηi is the own-price elasticity of product i, and ∂Qj/∂pi−∂Qi/∂pi is the additional
term. Based on the latter, the first case can be divided into further cases. For substitute
products, the value of the Lerner index is greater than the inverse of the price elasticity
of demand, i.e., the additional term is positive (∂Qj
∂pi
> 0). This means that a multi-
product monopoly sets a higher price than if the products were produced by separate
divisions. That is, the monopolist internalizes the effect of competition in prices, thereby
reducing the incentive to reduce prices that exists for individual firms. If the products are
complementary, then the opposite is true: the Lerner index is smaller than the inverse of




In this case, the positive effect on the demand for the two products is internalized by the
multi-product monopolist, resulting in lower prices than if the two products were produced
separately in the market. With regard to this sub-case, it is important to highlight that
for one product, the Lerner index may be less than or equal to zero. This means that for
this product, the monopoly sets a price below the marginal cost to fully benefit from the
complementary nature of the products on the other side. A similar phenomenon can be
observed for two-sided markets, which is discussed in detail in the next subsection.
In the second case, i.e. when demand is independent but costs are related, the
Ramsey formula is modified to the extent that the value of the Lerner index for product
i is affected by the level of production of the other product (j) through marginal cost.





















One of the typical reasons for this is the phenomenon of economies of scale, i.e. when
increasing the production of one product reduces the cost of producing another product.
In this case, the multi-product monopolist increases the volume sold by reducing the price
of product j, which reduces the marginal cost of product i, i.e. the margin of product
i will increase. Overall, therefore, if the phenomenon of economies of scale exists, the
multi-product monopolist will charge lower prices than if the two products were produced
by two separate companies.
In their paper, Armstrong and Vickers (2018) also extended the above theory to the
case of symmetric Cournot duopoly. In the model they prescribed, the consumer surplus
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was a function of quantities and not prices. The authors have shown, on the one hand,
that this approach returns the classical profit maximization problem for the multi-product
monopolist, or, more generally, the Ramsey problem for welfare maximization, where the
constrain is the profit. In the case of an oligopoly, they came to the conclusion that, by
properly weighting profit and consumer surplus, the Ramsey quantities correspond to the
equilibrium quantities of the Cournot model and vice versa.
1.4 On the pricing characteristics of two-sided mar-
kets
The main goal of the platforms is therefore to attract as many buyers and sellers as
possible, which they try to achieve by creating the right price structure. The problem,
as explained above, is somewhat similar to the problem of multi-product pricing, but
in two-sided markets, the consumer does not internalize the benefits that members of
the other segment derive from her entry. Thus, when examining two-sided markets, we
cannot confine ourselves to the theory of multi-product pricing described above, we are
faced with a much more specific case.
The theory of two-sided markets was developed by Tirole and Rochet (2003; 2004)
and Armstrong (2006). In these papers, the authors pointed out that the application of
basic, previously known pricing principles does not lead to profit-maximizing results in
two-sided markets.
In their paper, Tirole and Rochet (2003) analyzed the credit card market, but their
results can be generalized. In their model, the two segments were customers and stores
for whom two types of credit cards were available. These credit cards were distinguished
by the transaction cost incurred in using them. Stores could choose to accept only the
cheaper credit card (single-homing) or the more expensive one (multi-homing)9. If only
the cheaper card could be used for payment, then buyers had to decide whether to use
this card, i.e. to enter the platform or pay in cash, i.e. to stay away from the market. If,
on the other hand, both cards were accepted by that store, the customer used the card
of their choice. However, this did not necessarily coincide with the store’s preference.
Platforms have been able to reduce the fees charged to stores to accept the credit card
they sell in more places. The authors have come to the conclusion that with symmetrical
equilibrium, it is possible to pay with both cards in stores, and customers will use the
preferred credit card. The fee paid by the two segments was affected by the substitution
relationship between the credit cards. Based on this, two types of customer groups were
9In the literature, the term “single-homing” is used to describe consumption on one platform, while
the term “multi-homing” is used to describe consumption on multiple platforms.
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distinguished: those for whom the two cards were close substitutes and those who were
less willing to substitute the two cards for each other. The former group generated a
higher surplus for the stores, so if they were typically present in the market, the fee to be
paid by the stores increased and the fee charged to customers decreased. In the case of the
second group, the opposite happened: customers were forced to pay a higher price, while
shops paid a lower price. Based on the above results, several conclusions were also drawn.
On the one hand, it was pointed out that the total price is determined according to the
Lerner index, while the charges imposed on customers and shops are determined by the
platforms in proportion to the elasticities. If the latter finding is met by Ramsey prices,
then the price structure imposed results in maximum social welfare at a given total price.
However, the structure of Ramsey prices does not correspond to a fair cost allocation, the
aim is rather to lure both segments to the platform. The main difference between the
uniform pricing structure used by both the monopolist and the competing platform and
the Ramsey pricing is that the latter takes into account the net surplus on the other side
of the market when another consumer from one side joins the platform. However, when
uniform pricing is applied, there is no clear distortion in the price structure10. It was also
argued that the more buyers enter each platform, the more favorable will be the resulting
price structure for sellers, which is essentially a manifestation of the network effect typical
of two-sided markets.
In their 2004 paper, Tirole and Rochet have already sought to analyze two-sided
markets in general. In their view, a sharp distinction should be made between the
externalities of use and the benefits of membership. In the case of purely usage externaliti-
es, based on their results, the market can be considered two-sided if the number of
transactions can be increased by raising the price of one segment while lowering the
price of the other proportionately. On this basis, it was recognized that a necessary but
not sufficient condition for two-sided markets is that the Coase theorem fails in relation to
market transactions. That is, the benefit of the transaction between the two segments does
not depend on the total fee charged by the platform, but on the price structure defined by
it. Thus, the price structure in the market is not neutral, as the Coase theorem assumes.
The authors concluded that if only the benefits of use differ, the benefits of membership
do not, and the platform consciously determines the optimal prices, then the total price
is determined according to the Lerner index, while for the optimal price structure the
elasticities calculated for each segment must be the same. If the utility of consumers after
the connection is different and the platform charges membership fees, the total price level
can still be given based on the Lerner index, but in the case of the price structure, the price
charged to each segment, the transaction benefits they generate for the other segment and
10If demand is linear, then all price structures are optimal Ramsey price structures.
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the elasticity calculated in their case are decisive. If the two segments have the opportunity
to pay each other, based on the authors’ results, some of the platform’s variable costs will
be passed on to segment members following the Coasian bargaining. Where prices are
set with asymmetric information for two-sided markets, platforms should provide support
to consumers in bargaining. Finally, they also address the fact that platforms not only
create an equilibrium between the two segments through the price structure but often
also regulate the terms of transactions, protect their entrants with non-price means, and
monitor competition between sellers. By using these means, they sacrifice a portion of
their profits to limit one side in order to increase their attractiveness so that they can
recoup their generated losses on the other side.
The pricing peculiarities of two-sided markets were formally highlighted by Arm-
strong (2006). In the paper, the author analyzed the case of monopolistic and duopolistic
platforms within the framework of the Hotelling model. In a monopolistic model frame-
work, Armstrong examined how it works if the platform is able to increase the size of the
market by increasing consumer benefits. In the case of duopolistic platforms, he analyzed
consumers’ choices about single-homing and multi-homing. The author also paid special
attention to the study of the network effect in the case of two-sided markets. Armstrong
concluded that three factors determine the pricing structure imposed on the two segments:
1. The relative magnitude of network effect between segments: as the network
effect increases, the price charged to each segment decreases. And if the utility
generated by one side is higher in a transaction with the other side than vice versa,
then the platforms will charge a lower price to members of that segment than to the
high-profit side.
2. Type of pricing used by the platforms: the use of a fixed entry fee is preferred
when the willingness to pay of one segment is not affected by the performance of the
platform for the other segment, while the application of transaction-by-transaction
pricing is more appropriate when the network effect between the two segments is
strong.
3. Do members of the served segments access one or more platforms: if
members of one segment only access the platform they prefer, members of the other
segment will join multiple platforms in order to interact with as many consumers
in the other segment as possible. In this case, however, the platforms will have a
monopolistic power in terms of access to the players that only join them, so they
will set a monopolistic price for the players on the side forced to multi-home.
Thus, based on the literature, it can be concluded that whether it is a monopolistic
or a competing platform, it is typically worthwhile for their operator to charge a zero or
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sometimes negative price for a segment connected to their platform. This is because they
can attract more members of that segment, which makes them more attractive to the
other side, and they can benefit from this with suitably chosen pricing. To understand
the intuition behind these results, consider a platform that faces positive demand for
both consumer groups. If this platform were to operate as a traditional profit-maximizing
company and set profit-maximizing prices based on specific demand, positive prices would
be charged for each segment, provided that the service has a level on both sides for which
the marginal cost of a given quantity is lower than the corresponding reservation price.
This pricing strategy, on the other hand, is not necessarily optimal for two-sided markets,
as if demand on each side is influenced by the size of the other side of the market, higher
profits may be obtained if margins are close to or below marginal costs. If, as a result of
such a price, the demand of the other segment increases substantially due to the increase
in the size of the other side, the profit can be further increased by applying a price
determined with respect to higher demand compared to the traditional pricing strategy
with a positive price above marginal cost on both sides.
Wright (2004) summarized the characteristics of behavior observed in and signifi-
cantly different from traditional markets in relation to two-sided markets. The optimal
behavior of two-sided markets, based on the logic typical of classical (one-sided) markets,
can sometimes lead to incomprehensible and sometimes explicitly misleading, and even
incorrect conclusions from a regulatory point of view. Wright also concluded that the
pricing applied by the platforms depends fundamentally not only on the cost structure but
also on the externalities between segments. The resulting high margin is not necessarily
the embodiment of market power, just as pricing below cost does not necessarily mean
predatory pricing in the market. The author also highlighted that market competition
in two-sided markets does not necessarily result in a more efficient, more balanced price
structure between segments compared to a monopoly.
1.5 The empirical analysis of two-sided markets
There have been many empirical studies on the pricing of two-sided markets that have
examined the pricing method in the most typical areas, such as newspaper, telephone,
internet, or even airport. In these studies, the authors were typically interested in whether
firms in a given market operate as a two-sided market.
Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) attempted to determine the market power of
the four largest Italian newspapers (Corriere della Sera, La Repubblica, La Stampa, Il
Giornale) using an empirical model on the Italian newsprint market. To this end, a
database was set up containing data between 1976 and 2003 on turnover, advertising,
15
revenue, costs, nominal prices, reader characteristics, and additional information, such
as data on promotions for the period under review, the time of introduction of regular
supplements to newspapers, the time of editorial changes and the date of launch of the
newspaper website. As this is a two-sided market, several factors have been taken into
account in determining market power, not just price elasticity of demand. The authors
presented a model containing two demand functions (for readers and advertisers), while for
publishers they assumed that they would maximize profits. Their analysis also assumed
that readers’ demand was not affected by the number of ads. Two alternatives have been
formulated in connection with their study: newspapers are in oligopolistic competition
with each other or maximize their collective profit, i.e., they have examined competing
and collusive behavior. Based on the empirical results, on the one hand, their assumption
about readers was supported, and on the other hand, they came to the conclusion that
the pricing of newspapers is characterized by the maximization of collective profit, while
the market of advertisers is closer to competition. This result is interesting because
liberalization took place in the Italian newspaper market during the period under review,
which resulted in tacit collusion rather than a competitive environment in terms of results.
Another empirical study can be linked to Armstrong and Wright (2008), which
examined the landline and mobile phone markets in the UK. Analyzing the model under
different specifications, they came to the conclusion that a competitive edge emerges
in the case of the fixed network, resulting in too high, monopolistic prices. In contrast,
prices for the mobile phone network will be too low to reduce competition between service
providers. On the other hand, this situation is unsustainable in the long run, whereas, as
a result of supply-side substitution, monopoly prices on fixed networks are not optimal in
the long run. Based on the above, if the price is determined in a competitive situation, it
will always be above cost, while in the case of collusion, an inefficient, high price can only
emerge if calling on fixed networks becomes sufficiently important in the eyes of users.
Armstrong and Wright also looked at the issue of demand-side substitution, i.e., the case
where consumers may choose to use a cell phone instead of a landline to avoid higher per-
minute charges. Under the assumption of a uniform tariff, this can occur when the parties
call each other within a given service provider: then the service providers charge low prices
to their customers to protect them from the harmful effects of the high tariff. Thus, the
importance of the profit realized on the fixed network decreases, while due to the network
effect, the competition between the service providers becomes more intense. Overall, for
both supply- and demand-side substitution, the incentive for service providers to charge
above cost is reduced, but does not disappear completely. Another solution proposed by
the authors is to improve bargaining positions, as, in the basic model, mobile networks
have the full bargaining position, while fixed networks are in a vulnerable position.
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In their paper, Economides and Tåg (2012) examined the Internet market. A
model was built to examine the benefits of “net neutrality,” meaning that an ISP is
unable to charge a positive fee to content and application developers. In contrast, the
monopolistic or duopolistic model was in which service providers were free to price their
products. The authors concluded that, in addition to the above conditions and reasonable
parameter constraints, the regulator charges negative prices to the content provider,
while monopolistic and duopolistic platforms charge positive fees. At some values of
the parameters, the welfare of society increased with the introduction of net neutrality,
however, the opposite can also be said for other parameter values.
Frishammar et al. (2018) analyzed the challenges of shopping malls due to digitiza-
tion in an interpretive case study focusing on shopping malls in Denmark, Finland,
Norway, and Sweden. Data were collected in the form of workshops, interviews, and
questionnaires by the authors between November 2014 and November 2015. When analy-
zing the data, three digitization channels were identified, which were named digital
awaiter, digital data gatherer, and digital embracer. The grouping was based on the
center of gravity used by the malls (sellers or sellers and buyers alike are in focus) and
the role of digital technologies in the case of the mall (significant or insignificant). Digital
awaiters are characterized by the use of generally accepted, mature digital technologies,
i.e. they offer only simple services such as free Wi-Fi or a website. Thus, in their case,
the use of digital technologies is secondary, they do not have a critical impact on their
operation, they are most typically seen as a means of communication. The focus of value
creation on digital awaiters may be solely the seller segment, but there have also been
those who have considered both the seller and the buyer side. Although there is a kind of
negative attitude on their part based on the above, based on the interviews conducted, the
authors concluded that this is not necessarily the case for the shopping malls examined.
Digital data gatherers have included shopping malls that use increasingly sophisticated
and complex technologies to collect large amounts of data about their customers. This
data is then used, for example, to optimize the location of the stores, to facilitate the inflow
and outflow of customers, or, most typically, to pass on to sellers to increase the number
of visitors by suiting consumer needs. As a result, digital data gatherers typically focus
on the seller side, i.e. data collected from one side of the market (in this case consumers)
is passed on directly or indirectly to the other side of the market (sellers). Finally, a
digital embracer strategy is followed by shopping malls that, like digital data gatherers,
use increasingly sophisticated and complex digital technologies, but not only use them to
obtain information and pass it on to sellers but also to develop their own digital services.
In other words, in their case, digital technologies play a major role in their operation, they
are an integral part of their business strategy. The focus of these shopping malls is on
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both sides, actively providing value to both sellers and buyers. They will therefore develop
mechanisms to encourage participation on both sides and to coordinate the interactions
between the actors on both sides so that they serve the interests of each party.
1.6 Regulation of two-sided markets
The way in which two-sided markets are regulated is still a matter of debate today. Due
to the specificities reviewed in previous subsections, best practices for traditional markets
are not applicable to two-sided markets. Due to the peculiarities ignored, they do not
necessarily lead to the desired result, and in some cases may even lead to a detrimental
outcome from a welfare point of view. Nevertheless, there is a consensus on the need for
regulation, but the development of the right instruments, or even the right combination
of existing ones, is still ongoing.
In his paper, Wright (2004) collected and inspect eight “fallacies” that arise when
regulators want to apply the logic applied in traditional markets to two-sided markets:
1. "An efficient price structure should be set to reflect relative costs (user-pays).": In
order to develop an efficient pricing structure, the platforms need to take into
account not only the relative costs of the two consumer sides but also the additional
benefits that arise when a new member from the other segment enters the market.
That is they need to consider the relative magnitude of the network effect.
2. "A high price-cost margin indicates market power.": The idea is that increased
competition will lower prices to cost. However, in the case of two-sided markets,
the platform sets the price above cost for one segment and below cost for the other
group in the optimum. The price above cost thus shows nothing about the market
power of the given platform, as the price permanently above cost on one side shows
the difference in the magnitude of the network effect on the two sides in the case of
two-sided markets.11
3. "A price below marginal cost indicates predation.": In the case of two-sided markets,
the existence of market power does not necessarily imply output limitation, anti-
competitive ability, market failure, or deviation from a perfectly competitive market.
The problem of predatory pricing in the case of platforms arose precisely because of
this – falsely. Platforms set a price below cost for the segment that generates higher
11Depending on the definition of market power, platforms may have market power. According to
Wright (2004), if we define the existence of market power as the ability of a firm to profitably charge and
maintain a price above marginal cost, then each platform has significant market power in one segment. If,
on the other hand, we define it as the ability to profitably set and maintain a price above the competitive
price, then neither platform has market power.
18
benefits for the other segment. As this is a practice to gain higher market share in
traditional markets, regulators may suspect predatory pricing. The literature, on
the other hand, has recognized that this logic does not apply to platforms.
4. "An increase in competition necessarily results in a more efficient structure of pri-
ces.": In the case of two-sided markets, even a monopolistic platform is encouraged
to reduce prices on one side and thereby attract the other. Therefore, a priori, it
cannot be assumed that competition will lead to a more efficient price structure.
Although competition reduces the overall price level, it can even remove the price
structure from the efficient one.
5. "An increase in competition necessarily results in a more balanced price structure.":
It follows from the previous fallacy but it can be seen that it depends on the
specification of demand and the interaction between competition and consumer
demand. If one segment is loyal to the platform, then it is worth for the platforms
to decrease the price of the other side. If the segment that pays a higher price in
the equilibrium is loyal to the platform, then the price of the other, the supported
segment, decreases further, which removes the price structure from the efficient one.
The opposite – that is, a shift towards a balanced price structure – can happen
if one segment opts for multi-homing, which is basically facing a price below cost.
Then the price of the other segment will decrease, that is, the segment that faces a
price above cost in equilibrium.
6. "In mature markets (or networks), price structures that do not reflect costs are
no longer justified.": In the initial stage, the price below the cost charged to one
segment may be justified by the chicken-and-egg problem, namely that the platform
can attract one segment so that no one from the other segment has joined it yet.
This will also increase the demand for the platform in the other segment. However,
in the future, the platform will not substantially change its pricing: it will continue
to charge the segment generating the higher network benefit below cost, while the
other segment will be charged above cost. Thus, the chicken-and-egg problem does
not necessarily explain the application of prices below and above cost.
7. "Where one side of a two-sided market receives services below marginal cost, it must
be receiving a cross-subsidy from users on the other side.": The statement can be
attacked along with two logics. On the one hand, the idea ignores the fact that
the service provided to one segment depends on the service provided to the other
segment. If the platform were to exclude one segment, the other segment would also
exit from the platform. The revenue from the service provided to the two segments
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provides the platform’s total revenue so that the revenue generated by consumers
covers their additional costs ample. That is, there is no cross-financing. On the
other hand, the existence of cross-financing would mean that the segment that pays
a price above cost would be better off banning the other segment from the platform.
In addition, a platform could be created that would serve exclusively the high-paying
side and be able to profitably crowd out the other platform. However, by excluding
one segment, for the other segment, the platform would be able to impose only a
fraction of the price or nothing at all, which would not be profitable. Changing the
pricing structure – imposing a high price on the previously subsidized segment and
a low price on the non-subsidized segment – may also result in a worse outcome if
demand is reduced.
8. "Regulating prices set by a platform in a two-sided market is competitively neutral.":
Regulation is competitively neutral if it does not provide a competitive advantage
to unregulated companies. This is conditional on the market being sufficiently
competitive. This would be the case if a price reduction on one platform due to
regulation would force the other platform to reduce prices accordingly. However, a
non-regulated platform typically has no interest in introducing a sub-optimal price
structure, thereby gaining a competitive advantage over the regulated platform, so
regulation is not competitively neutral.12
Wright’s paper thus highlights that traditional logic is violated in the case of two-
sided markets, as both sides of the market need to be considered in these. A similar idea
is expressed by Rysman (2009), who analyzes antitrust investigations in his paper.
As a result of the network effect, trends in two-sided markets in many cases point
to the emergence of a monopolistic platform, which is often examined by competition
authorities. As one of the means for evaluating mergers, Rysmann cites simulations for
them, in which their effects on prices and outcomes are examined. In the case of two-sided
markets, however, when two platforms merge, complex two-sided issues should be taken
into account, such as the interaction between the two sides when setting prices. In a
merger, market power and the cost reductions resulting from the merger are considered.
In the case of two-sided markets, if costs fall on one side, the price charged on the other
side will also be affected. In addition, the merger may increase the market power of the
platform on both sides while reducing prices on one side.
Another means for assessing mergers that Rysmann addresses are regression analysis,
where, for example, prices are regressed on the number of firms present in the market.
12It should be noted that it is not necessarily true in the case of traditional markets that a non-regulated
company also reduced its price as a result of the regulation.
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However, in the case of two-sided markets, several prices need to be taken into account,
as well as different measures of competition for each side.
Antitrust investigations are based on the definition of the relevant market, to which
cross-price elasticity is typically applied. If, in the case of two-sided markets, regulators
seek to define the relevant market according to a similar methodology, they should take
into account endogenous changes in other prices at any price.
And when collusion took place, it is often necessary to set theoretical prices for
quantifying the damages, as would have been the case, for example, if the companies
had not colluded. Rysmann points out that such calculations are significantly affected by
the two-sided nature of the market, but may also have a similar effect on the design of
remedies for antitrust infringements.
Rysman (2009) already emphasizes the difficulty of defining the relevant market,
while Szilágyi (2012) analyzes in detail the difficulties involved and the differences with
traditional markets.
Szilágyi (2012) analyzed the applicability and challenges of competition law in two-
sided markets. As they have characteristics that traditional markets do not, it has been
seen that the previous practice cannot be applied without modification.
In each case, competition law analyzes are based on the delimitation of the relevant
market. In Hungary, Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair Market Conduct and
Restriction of Competition13 provides for the method of delimiting the relevant market.
Under Section 14 of the Act, "the relevant market shall be determined by reference to the
goods and the geographical area covered by the agreement." It is also necessary to take
into account the products with which the product under investigation can be substituted
(demand-side substitutability) and to consider supply-side substitutability. Once the
relevant market has been defined, the market share of the company under investigation
can be calculated, thus eliminating anti-competitive behavior.
Demand-side substitutability uses theoretical and/or empirical studies to determine
the range of products that consumers will buy instead of the product under investigation
as a result of a small but significant price increase. According to the author, one can talk
about a distorting force if such products cannot be identified. The latter finding, as it
will be shown later, is a serious source of conflict for two-sided markets. In the case of
supply-side substitutability, competition authorities examine which manufacturers would
be able to enter the relevant market in the short term with substitute products, i.e.
which companies would be able to quickly switch their production capacities. In this
step, therefore, potential competitors are mapped.
13Source: Act LVII, Jogtár (2020, November 03)
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Figure 1.6.1: Delimitation of the relevant market in classical markets
Manufacturer Manufacturer Potentialmanufacturer
Product under
investigation Substitute productNot a substitute product
Consumers
Relevant product market
Source: Szilágyi (2012, p.83.)
In the case of two-sided markets, the need to identify demand-side substitutes for
two distinct consumer groups, as well as the externalities between the two segments,
nuances the picture. In addition to positive externalities, as it has been shown earlier, the
number of members of the other segment present on the platform increases the demand
for the product or service provided by the platform.
Figure 1.6.2: Delimitation of the relevant market in the case of two-sided markets
Manufacturer Manufacturer Potentialmanufacturer
Product under






Source: Szilágyi (2012, p.84.)
The author pointed out that in the case of a platform-specific practice, i.e. that
one of the segments is admitted free of charge, the above methodology cannot be applied
without modifications. This is because, for some platforms, the value of the product
is given by the connected consumers. He also emphasized that non-price effects were
often more pronounced in two-sided markets than in traditional markets, and that price
effects should take into account the benefits on the other consumer side. Furthermore, he
noted that there is stronger competition with multi-homing than with single-homing and
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that the focus of the cost structure analysis should be on the whole service because the
component-based analysis can be misleading.
In the light of the above, the standard definition of market power, i.e. the ability
to price permanently above marginal cost, persists permanently in one consumer segment
of two-sided markets, while it cannot be interpreted in the case of the other. Thus, if
the authorities examine the existence of market power on a segment-by-segment basis,
this may lead to a detrimental outcome for consumer groups. As in the case of two-sided
markets, with the conquest of one of the consumer groups, the operation of the platform
is endangered or the given platform even ceases to exist, so the competition is reflected
in the fight for consumers. In the light of the above, Szilágyi argued that the selection
of effective solutions should be left to the market and that timely but only necessary
interventions should be sought.
However, there is still no uniform practice for determining the right time and the
necessary intervention. The reason for this is well illustrated by Szabó (2017), who
examined the possibility of applying data protection regulations in the case of two-sided
markets in connection with the "Google judgment"14, which ended in 2014. The lawsuit
was based on the easy availability of personal data and the fact that the user could
not have had access to the availability of this data. The case highlighted that the search
engine market is not properly regulated and that the issue of jurisdiction for third-country
companies also creates uncertainty.
During the review of the case, the author also highlighted the peculiarities of the
search engine market and the resulting incentives for circumvention. He assumes that
by understanding the entry threshold and network effect typical of two-sided markets,
legislation can be effectively enforced.
Szabó followed Szilágyi’s (2012) line of thought during the analysis. He identified
the search engine market as a relevant market, which is a basic service for internet users,
so there is no product to replace it. Search engines also access the number of searches,
the content they are looking for, and the geographical location of the person who started
the search. That is, although users use the service for free, their behavior represents value
to the platform. Based on the above data, search results, but also the advertisements
displayed, can be tailored to the tastes of consumers. On the consumer side, according to
Szabó, the network effect appears in the case of customizability, as they prefer the services
that can better satisfy their needs. And this is made possible by the availability of the
right amount and quality of data available on the more popular search engines. This gives
them a competitive advantage in making it easier to identify the improvements needed.
On the other hand, search engines that do not save the IP address (privacy-friendly),
14Source: EUR-Lex (2020, November 03)
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for example, are at a competitive disadvantage because they cannot meet consumers’
need for convenience. Szabó also emphasized that if they had to comply with strict data
protection rules, they would not be able to continue the above practice on the consumer
side, which would deprive them of a significant source of revenue. This is what gives
service providers a reluctance to regulate. Because the other side is the advertisers, where
search engines realize a significant portion of their profits, and they deliver advertisements
to consumers by setting their parameters. The more consumers they can reach with a
given search engine, the more effectively advertisers will be able to work, so their demand
for the platform will increase. However, the necessary condition for this is the existence
of personal data, which is why the advertiser side is also against strict data protection
regulations.
Finally, from a data protection legal point of view, the barrier to market entry also
deserves increased attention, according to Szabó. This is because, for a search engine to
work profitably, it requires the proper knowledge of the users as it becomes popular on
the other side by attracting them. Thus, Szabó pointed out that the barrier to entry is
given by this knowledge in the market, but there is no information available on the extent
to which this prevents entry. In the author’s view, the restriction of competition in such
markets reduces the chances of a competitive situation where users would also take into
account their privacy performance when choosing a search engine.
In assessing the lawsuit, Szabó emphasized that according to the court decision, the
platforms, whether they operate globally or locally, must comply with the rules of the
Member State in which they operate. So the geographical aspect is also important from
a data protection point of view.
The above judgment provided the basis for the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR)15, adopted in 2016 and entered into force in May 2018, which unifies data
protection requirements at the level of the European Union. Szabó emphasized that
this regulation was intended to make it easier to monitor the market, as it also applied
to companies established outside the Union. It will make it easier for EU citizens to
enforce their rights and will also make it easier for service providers to comply. In other
words, the protection of privacy is no longer merely a market advantage, but a minimum
expectation for service providers. Following the Google lawsuit and the commencement
of the regulation, the author considered it worthwhile to apply the experience to the
examination of platforms operating on a similar principle and to take into account the
peculiarities of the two-sided markets.
It is important to briefly summarize the GDPR as it covers several two-sided markets
such as Google, Facebook, but also telephone service providers and credit card issuers.
15Source: GDPR, EUR-Lex (2020, November 03)
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The new data protection regulation is binding on all companies operating or providing
services within the EU that process personal data, regardless of where they are established.
Personal data is any data on the basis of which a natural person can be directly or
indirectly identified. The regulation distinguishes between the data controller and the
data processor: the former merely deals with the collection of the data and forwards
it to the latter, another company that processes it. Both the data controller and the
data processor are obliged to prepare a data management information sheet, and the
former is obliged to indicate the processor in it as well. The information sheet must
be clear and unambiguous as well as it should cover the purpose for which the data
collected will be used, the method of data collection, and the conditions and timing of
processing. In the case of online service, users must also be informed about the cookies16
used, and in the case of cookies that are not required for the operation of the site, their
approval must also be requested. If unauthorized persons have access to the personal
data processed, the company must report the case to the National Data Protection and
Freedom of Information Authority (NAIH) in Hungary.17
The reviewed literature highlights the need to regulate two-sided markets, but it
is challenging to take their specificities into account. There is no uniform methodology
developed for this, so countries regulate the operation of the platforms according to their
own laws and discretion. Although the General Data Protection Regulation adopted by
the European Union provides the necessary basis for consumer protection, it is only one
of the areas covered by the regulation.
There are many examples of different regulations from recent years. In August 2014,
in Hungary, with the entry into force of Act XXII on the Advertising Tax18, the publishers
of advertisements and their customers were also required to pay taxes. Although the range
of taxpayers is quite wide, it should be mentioned here as it also affects platforms like
Google. In the case of advertisers, the tax is based on the net turnover from the taxable
activity, which needs to be adjusted by a number of items. The tax rate payable was
0 percent until June 2017 and then rose to 7.5 percent until July 2019. In the case of
customers, the part of the monthly fee paid for the publication of advertisements in excess
of HUF 2.5 million was the tax base, and the tax rate was 5 percent. Failure to pay the
tax resulted in a fine.
In January 2017, the National Tax and Customs Administration imposed a significant
default fine on Google, which eventually led to a lawsuit between Google and the Hungari-
16Cookies are small files stored on the computer that allow us to browse the Internet in a personalized
way. They store personal information such as login information or previous purchases. Because they store
personal information, they allow criminals to abuse. Source: http://www.whatarecookies.com/ (2021,
February 28)
17Source: GDPR, EUR-Lex (2020, November 03)
18Source: Act XXII, Jogtár (2020, November 02)
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an Government. Google argued that the tax imposed was discriminatory because foreign-
based companies were subject to higher penalties and that the tax violated the principle
of freedom to provide services. The lawsuit ended in March 2020 with the conclusion
that the advertising tax itself is not contrary to European Union law, but the system of
sanctions applied is objectionable.19
Another Hungarian precedent is the case of Uber. Uber was launched in Hungary
in November 2014 using a ride-sharing application. In contrast to taxi operators, Uber
drivers were subject to fewer regulations (for example, they did not have to apply the
statutorily fixed tariff, did not have to paint their vehicle yellow, were not subject to a
minimum luggage requirement, etc.), which caused outrage on the part of taxi drivers. In
this spirit, the Government has continuously made provisions to alleviate the competitive
disadvantage of taxi drivers (for example, the issuance of e-invoices and the application
of passenger permits has been made mandatory).
Finally, Uber announced that it would withdraw from Hungary on 24 July 2016
by enacting the Act LXXV of 2016 on the legal consequences of unauthorized passenger
transport services by car20. The law made it mandatory to operate a dispatch service
in accordance with the regulations. If this is not available and therefore a penalty is
imposed, websites that provide the illegal service will be blocked for 365 days. Those
who engage in illegal passenger transport services can be fined and their vehicle is taken
out of service. According to the European Commission’s resolution, Uber and other
platforms operating along similar principles should also be given special treatment, as
their services are provided on an ad hoc basis and are based on a sharing economy model,
thus operating differently from professional service providers. They also see the need to
harmonize regulations, and a total ban is proposed only as a last resort.21
The idea also arose in the UK’s capital not to renew Uber’s taxi service license,
meaning to ban the operator from the city. In November 2019, Transport for London
(TfL), the City Hall organization that manages public transport in London, refused to
grant the permit because Uber did not meet the required conditions. Finally, following
Uber’s appeal, in September 2020, the Westminster Magistrates’ Court in London issued
an order allowing Uber to continue operating in London22. Mention should also be made
of California, where a referendum decided whether to ban Uber and Lyft from the state.23
The practice of the above countries is contrasted with the case of Estonia, where
19Source: Digital giants cannot avoid paying taxes either (Hungarian), Website of the Hungarian
Government (2020, November 02)
20Source: Act LXXV, Jogtár (2020, November 03)
21Source: European Parliament (2020, November 21)
22Source: Uber can stay in London (Hungarian), MTI, 2020, September 28. (2020, November 21)
23Lyft also provides passenger services in the United States and Canada. Source: Lyft (2020, November
03)
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Uber and Taxify were first legalized in November 2017.24 The new transport law no
longer separates ride sharing from the taxi service, while at the same time easing the
requirements for the latter. The taxi service is divided into 4 categories in the law:
1. Classic taxis with an illuminated sign and a taximeter;
2. Cars that can be ordered through a mobile application and for which payment will
be made through the help of the mobile application;
3. Cars with a taximeter but with no illuminated sign;
4. Cars with an illuminated sign but with no taximeter.
Separate rights have been defined for each category. For example, anyone who has
a taximeter is not required to serve their customer through a mobile app. Cars with an
illuminated sign can also use public transport lanes, while cars without an illuminated
sign and a taximeter cannot, and they must issue all invoices through the mobile app.
Those who provide their service through the mobile app can install an illuminated sign
on their car, but the vehicle and driver must have all the necessary permits to do so.
As an exception, the case of ride-sharing also appears in the law, when passengers join a
planned trip and thus the driver does not earn income.
To become a Uber driver in Estonia, you only have to meet a few requirements25:
1. You must register online on the website;
2. You must upload the required documents (identity card, driving license, copy of
car insurance, bank statement, profile picture) to the system;
3. You must obtain the service license and vehicle license required for the Uber;
4. You must have a car;
5. Finally, you need to activate your registration.
Thus, it can be seen that countries reacted differently to the emergence of Uber with
different regulations. Judging which country is on the right track is extremely difficult. In
the absence of uniform rules, the harmonization outlined in the European Commission’s
resolution cannot take place. The paper by Szilágyi (2012) and Szabó (2017) illustrates
why it is difficult to create a uniform and, above all, workable regulation for two-sided
markets.
24Source: Uber and Taxify will be legal in Estonia, BTN (2020, November 03)




Product differentiation in two-sided
markets1
2.1 Product differentiation and two-sided markets
The basic model of product differentiation can be linked to Hotelling (1929). The
Hotelling model is based on a linear line on which consumers are evenly distributed
and companies decide on their spatial location. A point in space actually indicates the
differentiation of a product, so companies determine the characteristics of their products
through their location decision, while the location of consumers represents the ideal
product for them. The discrepancy between the product offered and the product to be
consumed, i.e. the incomplete customization of the product, represents a negative benefit
or cost for consumers. This discrepancy in the characteristics of the product is captured
by the travel cost in the Hotelling model. Further development of the Hotelling model is
the district model of Salop (1979), which eliminates the problems of the previous model2
and is also suitable for the analysis of multi-player markets. Similarly, in this case, the
product differentiation is determined by the spatial location of the companies.
The above two models have resulted in several papers focusing on the effect of
product differentiation on pricing3, but in these, the parameter expressing the degree of
product differentiation is an exogenous variable and is not influenced by companies. The
first paper in which companies directly defined the differentiation of their product can
1Based on Bakó and Horváth (2020).
2For example, d’Aspremont et al. (1979) have proved that with linear transportation costs the
Principle of Minimum Differentiation is invalid.
3See. for example, Hobbs (1986), who analyzed the effect of the appearance of spatiality in
the case of Bertrand and Cournot competition, while Thisse and Vives (1988) examined the decision
between the unit price and price discrimination. In both papers, the authors concluded that product
differentiation increases competition and that the dominant strategy on the part of companies is to apply
price discrimination.
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be attributed to von Ungern-Sternberg (1988). The author examined the incentives of
companies to produce general purpose products within the framework of the Salop model,
i.e. how product differentiation affects the market share and profit of companies. In his
model, he approached product differentiation, in contrast to conventional approaches,
not by choosing a location or determining the number of companies entering, but by the
ability to influence travel costs. This was justified by the fact that in practice, product
differentiation is best captured not by the right choice of location, but by the ability to
influence transport costs. As an example, he cited the IBM 360 series, which was the first
computer family to be used in many areas, from business use to scientific application.
Based on these, the basic assumption of the author’s model was that the lower the travel
cost, the more general purpose the product. He found that companies are motivated by
consumer preferences to produce products for more general purposes, that is, to reduce
product differentiation, and as a result, they set travel costs below the social optimum.
The shortcoming of the above paper, according to Hendel and de Figueiredo (1997),
is that companies decide first on location and then on product differentiation, and is
therefore not suitable for examining the effect of the latter decision on pricing. This
is why Hendel and de Figueiredo examined a three-period game where companies set
their prices after deciding on location and product differentiation. They concluded that if
companies produce general purpose products free of charge, optimally only two companies
will enter the market and offer fully customized products. If it is costly for companies
to produce a general-purpose product, the customization of the products will decrease,
price competition between companies will decrease, and more than two companies will be
present in the market at optimum.
A different approach was taken by the paper by Ferreira and Thisse (1996), in which
the impact of different transportation technologies on firms’ pricing and market share
was analyzed within the framework of the Launhardt model. As the two companies had
different transport costs, their products could be considered differentiated. If companies
can decide on the transport technology used and are located at two endpoints of the
market, it is advisable to differentiate their products minimally. This result is consistent
with von Ungern-Sternberg’s (1988) result.
In two-sided markets, the ability to differentiate products has received little attention.
In their paper, Armstrong andWright (2007) examined the effect of the product differentia-
tion and network effect on prices and users’ platform choice, however, in this paper,
product differentiation as a decision factor did not appear. They concluded that as
the network effect increases, the connection fee payable decreases, while it increases as
product differentiation increases. The authors also noted that with significant product
differentiation across both sides, actors will only enter one platform, i.e., they will strictly
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prefer single-homing behavior. In contrast, if product differentiation is specific to only
one side, actors in the other segment want to be active on multiple platforms. However,
platforms can and want to prevent this by introducing exclusive contracts.
In the case of two-sided markets, the decision on product differentiation is examined
below. However, the presented model differs in two aspects from the standard models
used in the literature. First, in the model presented below, asymmetric platforms are
considered instead of symmetric platforms. Similar to Bakó and Fátay (2018), this model
has an intra-group effect on one side and an inter-group effect on the other.
There are a number of examples of asymmetric network effects instead of symmetric
network effects in two-sided markets. Consider, for example, a social media provider
where the company provides a platform for user-advertiser interaction. However, in this
relationship system, the classic symmetric network effect does not prevail, as it was seen
in the examples mentioned in the previous chapter because in most cases users do not
benefit from interactions with advertisers, but from the ability to interact with other
users using the platform. That is, in their view, there is an intra-group network effect.
On the other hand, it is still true for the advertiser side that the larger the group of users
they access using the platform, the more valuable its service will be to them. So for the
advertiser side, a positive inter-group network effect, which is considered classic, prevails.
The other aspect in which the model differs from the models presented in the
literature is that platforms are able to determine the extent to which they want to
differentiate their products. By this, it becomes a decision factor how much customizability
they provide to the actors joining the platform.
There are several examples of this practice. On most platforms, it is possible to
define a user-level interface and make it customizable by the user. For example, one
can think about the customizability of the Google, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram
accounts, but even the types of feeds one can choose for news providers.
Consider a less obvious example, the Netflix online media service platform: the
more subscribers Netflix has, the more accurate the referral system is, as the more likely
it is that the recommended show will suit the viewer’s taste. As a result, the more
people use Netflix, the more useful it will be for a user. Furthermore, the more Netflix
subscribers, the more attractive it becomes to production offices and content providers.
Another feature of Netflix is that it provides users with a personalized profile, meaning
that subscribers receive a differentiated service in exchange for a monthly subscription
fee. Overall, therefore, Netflix is not only an example of asymmetric two-sided markets
but also fits into the concept of platforms using product differentiation.
The possibility of customization can be important because it also makes the service
of the platform more attractive to users who would not otherwise connect to the platform.
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The model outlined below seeks to answer the question of how asymmetric two-sided
markets price their products and services, and how this pricing decision depends on the
degree of customizability. For example, one can think of the multitude of products and
services available online. Generally speaking, most of these are available in two forms:
a form that provides a limited user experience but is available for free, or at a positive
price in the form of a product or service that provides several customizability options,
even additional services. The aim of the model described below is to better understand
this phenomenon.
2.2 The model
Consider a classic Hotelling market and suppose that two platforms, 1 and 2, operate
in the market. They face two types of consumer groups, users (k) and advertisers (l).4
It is assumed that both consumer groups are evenly distributed over the unit interval
representing the market and that the platforms are located at the two endpoints, with
platform 1 at 0 and platform 2 at 1. This is illustrated in Figure 2.2.1. For simplicity, it
is assumed that the platforms will operate at zero cost.





Consumers are assumed to realize vi (i = k, l) benefits from joining a platform,
however, they have to pay a non-negative price, pi,j, for entering (j = 1, 2). There is a
further reduction in utility for consumers if they are not joining a platform with an ideal
location for them, which is embodied in the transportation cost, ti,j, expressed as a linear
function of the distance between the consumer’s location and the platform of her choice.
More specifically, the consumer of type i, when entering a platform j at a distance d,
suffers a utility loss of magnitude ti,jd, and it is assumed that ti,j ≥ 0 for all i = k, l and
j = 1, 2. Because the aim is to examine the customizability provided to the user side,
the transportation cost of the advertiser side will be kept constant for future traceability
and it is assumed that tl,j = 1.
4Hereinafter, the actors that demand the service of the platform are generally referred to as consumers.
However, if it is important to differentiate consumers by segment, they will be called users and advertisers.
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The specificity of two-sided markets, as explained above, is the effect of the network
effect between the two segments. As a result, it is assumed that consumers connecting to
the platform will benefit more from connecting to a larger platform than if they choose a
platform on which fewer users are active. However, instead of assuming classic platforms,
the performance of asymmetric platforms5 is examined and it is assumed that advertisers
benefit from the increase in the number of users connected to the platform. Users do not
have an inter-group network effect like this but have a classic intra-group network effect.
Based on this, the more users connect to a given platform, the greater the benefits to users
of logging in to the platform. Hereinafter, the number of k-type consumers connected to
platform j is denoted by nk,j and it is assumed that the additional benefit of the i-type
consumer connected to the platform from interactions can be expressed by bink,j, where
0 < bi < 1 (i = k, l) expresses the magnitude of the network effect.6
Following the literature on asymmetric platforms, it is assumed that users will
connect to only one platform, while advertisers, if interested, will advertise on both
platforms. For the sake of simplicity, it is also assumed that users realize some positive
utility from the connection as a result of the basic service provided by the platform, even
if no other user has joined it7, whereas advertisers only realize positive utility if users
enter the platform.
Based on the above, the benefit of a k-type consumer (user) with x location, if she
choose platform 1, can be given by the following utility function:
uk,1 (x) = vk + bknk,1 − pk,1 − tk,1x, (2.2.1)
while if she connects to the other platform, the benefits will be
uk,2 (x) = vk + bknk,2 − pk,2 − tk,2 (1− x) (2.2.2)
The benefit of the type l consumer (advertiser) when entering platform 1 will be
ul,1 (x) = blnk,1 − pl,1 − x, (2.2.3)
while
ul,2 (x) = blnk,2 − pl,2 − (1− x) (2.2.4)
5See Bakó and Fátay (2018)
6Note that there is no difference between transactions that occur on the platform and transactions
that potentially occur on the platform. In practice, it is assumed that there is exactly one transaction
between each of the different types of consumers connected to the platform. The use of this assumption
is widespread in the literature. See, for example, Armstrong and Wright (2007).
7Thus, it is assumed that there is a direct network effect on the users, i.e. the ownership of the
platform’s product or service also generates benefits for the players of the segment.
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will be the realized benefit if she chooses the other platform. If she advertises on both
platforms, the realized benefit can be specified with the following function:
ul,1,2 (x) = blnk,1 − pl,1 − x+ blnk,2 − pl,2 − (1− x) , (2.2.5)
in which case the advertiser’s payment will be independent by the location.




pi,jDi,j (p) , (2.2.6)
where Di,j (p) is the demand of type i consumers for the service of platform j as a function
of p = (pk,1, pk,2, pl,1, pl,2), i.e. the vector of prices determined by the platforms.
The game is as follows: In the first period, the platforms decide simultaneously on
the differentiation of their service, which is expressed in terms of the transportation cost
on the user side, and then in the second period they determine the subscription fees.
Finally, the players on both sides, observing these decisions, decide which platform to
join, and eventually, the market clears up.
Transportation cost, as a decision variable, aims to capture the incentives of plat-
forms to differentiate products. For most information products, consumers have the
opportunity to use the service they use in a personalized way, within certain limits. This
customizability is intended to be captured by the size of the transportation cost. The
greater the consumer’s room for maneuver in shaping the given service according to his
own idea, the lower the transportation cost she will face when consuming it, while the
more limited the possibilities of customization, the higher the transportation cost of using
the platform’s service.
The solution to the game is given by its subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, which
can be obtained by backward induction due to the sequential nature of the game.
Two cases are examined: when platforms compete with each other for consumers,
and when they behave as a local monopoly.
2.2.1 Competition
Suppose that platforms have chosen tk,j transportation costs as well as pi,j prices in
previous periods. To determine demand, it is needed to specify the consumers, more
specifically the location of consumers who are indifferent to which platform to connect
to. Consider k-type consumers first. A user with location x for whom x ≤ xk, where xk
is the location of the indifferent user, will join platform 1, while everyone else will choose
platform 2. It is true for the location of the indifferent user that the utilities given by the
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terms (2.2.1) and (2.2.2) are the same. From this, the indifferent user is located at the
xk =




Similarly, in determining an advertiser’s demand for platforms, first, the location
of advertisers must be determined who are indifferent to whether to enter only one or
both platforms. Denote by xl,1 the location of the advertiser who is indifferent to joining
platform 1 or both, and xl,2 by the location of the advertiser who is indifferent to joining
platform 2 or both. Figure 2.2.2 is intended to illustrate the situation of indifferent
consumers.
Figure 2.2.2: The location of indifferent consumers and the demand for platforms’ service
0 xk 1
User side:
0 xl,1 xl,2 1
Advertiser side:
From the equations ul,1 (xl,1) = ul,1,2 (xl,1) and ul,2 (xl,2) = ul,1,2 (xl,2), it follows that
the indifferent actors on the advertiser side are located at
xl,1 = 1− (blnk,2 − pl,2) (2.2.8)
and
xl,2 = blnk,1 − pl,1, (2.2.9)
respectively.
Provided that all consumers realize positive utility at the given prices, that is, that
vk is at least as large as all users connected to a platform in equilibrium, and taking
advantage of the fact that nk,1 is equal to xk in equilibrium and nk,2 is equal to 1 − xk,
the demand for the platforms can be given by the following terms:
Dk,1 (p) =
pk,2 − pk,1 + tk,2 − bk
tk,1 + tk,2 − 2bk
(2.2.10)
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Dk,2 (p) = 1−Dk,1 (p) (2.2.11)
Dl,1 (p) = 1 + pl,2 +
bl (pk,2 − pk,1 + bk − tk,1)




bl (pk,2 − pk,1 − bk + tk,2)
tk,1 + tk,2 − 2bk
− pl,1. (2.2.13)
Using these terms, platform profits can be defined as follows:
π1 (pk,1, pl,1) = pk,1Dk,1 (p) + pl,1Dl,1 (p) , (2.2.14)
and
π2 (pk,2, pl,2) = pk,2Dk,2 (p) + pl,2Dl,2 (p) . (2.2.15)
Platform j defines connection charges for which it is true that
∂πj
∂pi,j
= 0 ∀i = k, l. (2.2.16)
From the solution of the system of equations formed by these first-order conditions,
it follows that in equilibrium
pk,1 =
(2tk,1 + 2tk,2 − b2l − 4bk) (2tk,1 + 4tk,2 − b2l − 6bk)
2 (6tk,1 + 6tk,2 − 2b2l − 12bk)
, (2.2.17)
pk,2 =
(2tk,1 + 2tk,2 − b2l − 4bk) (4tk,1 + 2tk,2 − b2l − 6bk)
2 (6tk,1 + 6tk,2 − 2b2l − 12bk)
, (2.2.18)
pl,1 =
bl (2tk,1 + 4tk,2 − b2l − 6bk)




bl (4tk,1 + 2tk,2 − b2l − 6bk)
2 (6tk,1 + 6tk,2 − 2b2l − 12bk)
. (2.2.20)
In addition to the above prices, the companies’ profits are as follows:
π1 =
(4tk,1 + 4tk,2 − b2l − 8bk) (2tk,1 + 4tk,2 − b2l − 6bk)
2




(4tk,1 + 4tk,2 − b2l − 8bk) (4tk,1 + 2tk,2 − b2l − 6bk)
2
16 (3tk,1 + 3tk,2 − b2l − 6bk)
2 . (2.2.22)
As a final step, consider decisions about the variables that capture the customizabili-
ty chosen by the platforms. By maximizing the profit functions given by terms (2.2.21)
and (2.2.22) with respect to transportation costs and taking advantage of the symmetry
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between firms, the following proposition is made.
Proposition 1. In an asymmetric two-sided market, where two platforms operate at
two endpoints in the market, members of the user and advertiser segments are evenly
distributed across the market, and platforms compete with each other for subscribers,
the following equilibrium emerges if the platforms also decide on product differentiation.
Platforms optimally define transportation costs
tk,j =
b2l
4 + bk ∀j = 1. 2 (2.2.23)
In addition to these transportation costs, prices of pk,j = 0 and pl,j = bl4 are set and a profit
of πj = b
2
l
16 is realized. In equilibrium, on the user side, the indifferent consumer will be at







locations will advertise on both platforms. The other advertisers only enter the platform
closest to them.
It can be seen that in the case of competing platforms, as the network effect increases,
the customizability of the products offered by companies decreases. As a result, however,
the service of the platforms is less valuable to users, so they are only willing to pay a lower
price for it. To offset this, companies allow users to join for free and achieve a positive
profit at the price charged to advertisers. The greater the benefit to advertisers of being
able to transact with users, the higher the price the platform will be able to enforce on
the advertiser side, and the profit will increase accordingly. In contrast, as prices rise, a
smaller and smaller proportion of advertisers choose to join both platforms.
However, the above result will only be the equilibrium outcome of the game if the
basic assumption is true that both sides of the market are fully covered, i.e. that all
consumers are willing to enter a platform at given prices. However, this is only the case
if the realized utility at the given prices to the consumer realizing the lowest utility after







2bk ≥ 0 (2.2.24)






4 ≥ 0, (2.2.25)
hold. These conditions are met for all vk ≥ b
2
l
8 . However, if the benefit from using the
platform is less than b
2
l
8 , then the behavior of the platforms in the equilibrium of the game
differs from that described above.
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2.2.2 Local monopolies
With low vk values, some consumers – those who are far enough away from the platforms
– decide that they do not want to connect to any of the platforms at the given prices.
Such a case is represented in Figure 2.2.3.
Figure 2.2.3: User demand for platforms in the case of an uncovered market
0 x̃1k x̃2k 1
User side:
Thus, the markets of the platforms on the user side do not meet, i.e., companies
operate as local monopolies. In this case, in the absence of direct competition for users,
the platforms will charge prices so that the net benefits realized by the most distant
consumers connected to the platforms will be zero, i.e. vk + bk,jnk,j − pk,j − tk,jx̃k,j = 0
will be satisfied for all j = 1, 2. Proposition 2 is obtained using the methodology used
previously.
Proposition 2. In asymmetric two-sided markets, where two platforms operate at two
endpoints, users and advertisers are evenly distributed along the interval, and the platforms
act as local monopolies, the following equilibrium emerges if the platforms also decide on
product differentiation. Platforms optimally define a transportation cost of
tk,j = 0. (2.2.26)
In addition to these transportation costs, prices of pk,j = vk2 and pl,j =
bl
4 are set and








is realized. In equilibrium, on the user side, the








locations will advertise on both platforms. The other advertisers only
enter the platform closest to them.
Note that in the above equilibrium, unlike in the previous case, the platforms provide
users with maximum customizability characterized by zero transportation costs. Because
users reap low benefits from connecting to platforms, companies try to make the platforms
more attractive to users and thus more attractive to consumers on the other side, taking
full advantage of the possibility of customization. In equilibrium, platforms are priced so
that their markets are just separated at the midpoint of the market and can continue to
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operate as a local monopoly. That is, indifferent users are in the middle of the market,
and since at zero prices, users reap positive utility with all non-negative vk due to the
network effect, this provides an opportunity for platforms to set a positive connection fee.
Since in equilibrium, platforms can attract the same number of users as in the previous




4 , and there will continue to be advertisers who will advertise on both platforms.
As before, the number of these advertisers decreases as their network effect increases: the
higher the benefit they realize from interacting with users, the more it is worthwhile for
them to join only one or the other platform.
2.3 Summary
In general models of product differentiation, companies are able to influence the differentia-
tion of their products by choosing their location, but while this reduces transportation
costs for some consumers, the opposite is true for other consumers. Nowadays, on the
other hand, we are consuming more and more information products, for which consumers,
to a greater or lesser extent, have the opportunity to consume them in a personalized
way, according to their own tastes. This phenomenon is not sufficiently captured by
the methodology used in the literature, so we examined von Ungern-Sternberg’s (1988)
approach to two-sided markets.
The study of customizability is justified by the fact that the platforms can this way
reach and attract consumers who would not otherwise join them. To this end, a model
was presented in which the platforms customize the products and services they offer by
influencing the transportation cost. It was assumed that the lower the transportation
cost, the more the product is tailored to the consumer’s taste. In addition, instead of
assuming symmetric market in the analysis of two-sided markets, this issue has been
explored for asymmetric markets, as for many platforms, consumers care about the
number of members in their own segment, while sellers benefit from the number of the
other segment. Examples include streaming media providers like Netflix or Disney+, or
online video sharing sites like YouTube. In the model, the question was examined how
product differentiation affects the pricing of the products and services they offer in the
case of asymmetric two-sided markets.
The results of the model suggest that profit-maximizing platforms provide users with
either maximum customizability at a positive price or somewhat limited customizability
at a zero price, depending on the utility from consumption. This is supported by several
practical observations. However, the company does all this in order to make its own
platform attractive enough to the other side of the market, i.e. to the advertisers. This
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is because a significant part of the company’s profit comes from the consumption of the
players on this site.
The above results differ from those described in the literature. While von Ungern-
Sternberg (1988) has come to the conclusion that companies are encouraged to produce
general purpose products, i.e. they will reduce the differentiation of their products, Hendel
and de Figueiredo (1997) added that this is only true if companies produce their products
free of charge. In contrast, with costly manufacturing, customizability is reduced. And
the results from Ferreira and Thisse (1996) suggested that if companies can choose their
transportation technology and are located at two endpoints in the market, they will
minimally differentiate their products. That is, the effect of product differentiation is just
the opposite in the case of two-sided markets as in the case of standard markets, which
is a result of the network effect between the two segments.
All these results also provide important lessons from a regulatory point of view. As
it has been shown, platforms quite often apply zero, in practice even negative price, in
order to make a profit through the services provided to the other side’s players. This
practice is not necessarily a concern in terms of competition law per se, but requires
special attention, as the analysis of Szilágyi (2012) and Szabó (2017) has shown.
Based on the results, the ability of a platform to gain market power is somewhat
hampered by the possibility of customization. As it was seen, if platforms act as a local
monopoly, they will ultimately provide users with the maximum degree of customizability
in equilibrium. This, in turn, spreads competition for advertisers to the other side of
the market, even if companies operate in well-separated markets. It can be said that
competition on one side of the market in two-sided markets will automatically spread to
the other side of the market, and if not in terms of prices, it will have an impact in some
other dimension. Therefore, it is not necessarily a problem for a platform to have an
exceptionally large market share in the user market, provided that it is forced to compete
with other platforms on the other side of the market, the advertising market.
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Chapter 3
Public and private contracts in
two-sided markets
3.1 Introduction
As in any market, there are many examples for two-sided markets where platforms offer
public or even private contracts to sellers entering them. These contracts typically specify
a variable and/or a fixed fee to be paid as a result of the transactions.
An example of a public contract is the eBay online auction site, whose rules list
the fees to be paid item by item. Examples of both variable and fixed fees can be found
in the regulations1. Consider the case where books are sold through eBay. After a
successful transaction, taking into account the value of the auction and the number of
books purchased, the seller will have to pay 12 percent of the final price, but a maximum
of $750. So below a certain final amount and amount of books, this will be the variable fee
that arises as a result of the transaction, while once the maximum threshold is reached,
the seller will not pay a variable fee for the transaction. In addition, the seller have to
pay to list the goods: according to eBay policy, the first 50 listings are free every month,
but above that, $0.35 should be paid for each product listed, regardless of whether it was
sold and, if so, for how much and in what quantity, i.e., this item is considered as a fixed
fee.
If one is looking for an example of using a private contract, then Netflix, Spotify,
and Sony Music, but Apple and Microsoft can be considered, too. In the case of these
companies, there is an idea of what business policy they are pursuing, however, it is not
possible to say item by item how much they spent or where their revenue came from. Take
Spotify, for example. It is basically available for free, although the user encounters many
1On http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/fees.html (2020, October 18) you will find all the fees charged
by eBay.
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advertisements while listening to music. On the other hand, for 2.5–8 euros, one can also
subscribe to the packages offered by the company, which removes advertisements, provides
faster access, and even allows offline music listening. This is essentially a set access fee for
consumers to the platform. The other side of Spotify is provided by the content creators.
The amounts offered to them are typically secret, but it made the dust fly in 2015 when
hackers leaked a contract between Spotify and Sony Music.2 It can be seen from this that,
on the one hand, the two companies contracted an advance of $42.5 million in connection
with the transfer of the contents, which corresponds to a fixed fee included in the contract.
The variable fee is made up of three items under the contract: the ad-supported free tier,
online day passes (which no longer exist), and Spotify’s premium service. In each case,
Sony Music will receive 60 percent of Spotify’s revenue multiplied by Sony Music’s market
share. That is if Spotify earned $100 million in a given month and Sony Music’s share
of streams was 10 percent, it could claim 10 percent of $60 million, or $6 million. In
addition, however, the contract also included a minimum clause calculated on the basis
of usage and subscribers. These ensure that if, for example, royalties from usage exceed
the amount available under the above formula, Sony will receive the higher amount. Sony
Music will get $0.00225 per stream according to the usage-based minimum clauses unless
Spotify has not met its growth target in a given month, in which case the fee will increase
to $0.0025 per stream. In the case of the minimum condition for premium subscribers,
the amount due to Sony Music under the contract is calculated by taking the percentage
of use of the Sony Music label (i.e. how much of all the content viewed is attributable to
Sony) multiplied by the number of premium subscribers, and by $6.00.
Thus, it can be seen that there are many examples of the use of both public and
private contracts, however, the literature analyzing two-sided markets usually assumes
public contracts in the market, i.e. all actors have all the information available in the
market. One of the earliest papers, which also deals with the application of private
contracts, can be linked to Armstrong and Wright (2007). In their paper, however, at
the level of modeling, the effect of private contracts on the equilibrium is not yet visible,
only their application by platforms emerges as an alternative strategy. The authors point
out that if one side – typically sellers – enters both platforms, the platforms will have
the opportunity to offer contracts to members of this segment that will deter them from
multi-homing in some form. If the platform offers these exclusive contracts, the authors
concluded that the platform’s previously used strategy will change to the opposite, and
a high access fee will be set for the previously supported segment until the previously
unsupported segment is subsidized.
For an incumbent and an entrant platform, Doganuglu and Wright (2010) analyzed
2Source: The Verge (2021, January 02)
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the use of exclusive contracts in two-sided markets: they sought an answer as to when an
incumbent platform is worth contracting exclusively with market players. Based on their
results, if the incumbent is confronted exclusively with consumers, i.e. the market can
still be considered one-sided and therefore can only contract with them, then if consumers
join only one platform, full foreclosure will take place in the market using the contracts.
Conversely, if the consumer segment can purchase products from more than one company,
the incumbent can only partially foreclose the entrant through exclusive contracts. In
these types of markets, the use of exclusive contracts thus leads to an anti-competitive
and inefficient outcome. In contrast, in the case of two-sided markets, the use of private
contracts results in a more favorable outcome for one segment, even if by using them the
platform present in the market completely excludes the entrant from the market.
The application of public and private contracts in two-sided markets was first
examined by Llanes and Ruiz-Aliseda (2015) in a model framework.3 Their goal was to
examine if a monopolistic platform offers private contracts to multi-homing sellers, how
the platform’s strategy, as well as sellers’ pricing strategy, will change. The authors came
to the conclusion that when using private contracts, the platforms reduce the subscription
fee for consumers, so much so that they end up attracting them with discounts and gifts. In
contrast, contracts offered to sellers include franchise and fixed access fees that ultimately
encourage them to set collusive prices. That is, the authors have proved Armstrong
and Wright (2007)’s statement that private contracts change the optimal behavior of
platforms and have a significant impact on market price structure, as the price charged
to the previously unsupported segment decreases while the previously subsidized segment
experiences substantial fee increases.
In this chapter, a model is presented where the impact of the above two types
of contracts, namely public and private contracts, are examined within the framework
of duopolistic two-sided markets. It is examined whether the statement of Armstrong
and Wright (2007) that platforms change their optimal strategy in addition to private
contracts also exists in the context of the present model, and the finding of Llanes and
Ruiz-Aliseda (2015) that the franchise and fixed access fees offered under contracts result
in collusive prices for platform-specific products. The question is also addressed whether,
in the context of duopolistic two-sided markets, in addition to public and private contracts,
single-homing or multi-homing behavior is preferred by sellers.
Section 3.2 describes the model used in the analysis, and then Section 3.3 examines
the case of public contracts. The answer to the question of whether, in addition to public
contracts, platforms encourage sellers wishing to enter the market for single-homing or
3For traditional markets, the analysis of private contracts is more extensive. See, for example, Bakó
(2012) or Bakó (2016).
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multi-homing, and which output is more favorable for consumers, is looked for.
In Subsection 3.3.1, the model is examined in which sellers subscribe to only one platform,
and then in Subsection 3.3.2, the case is analyzed where they enter both platforms.
Thereafter, Subsection 3.3.3 compares the results of the two models. In Section 3.4.
private contracts are introduced into the model, more specifically in the case of the model
described in Subsection 3.3.2, platforms are allowed to enter into private contracts with
sellers. This is because, as Armstrong and Wright (2007) have pointed out, it is in the
interest of platforms to offer private contracts when sellers are present on more than one
platform, as the purpose of these contracts is typically to deter multi-homing. The results
of the model are compared with the conclusions of the relevant model of public contracts
to determine the impact of private contracts on welfare. Finally, Section 3.5 summarizes
the findings of the chapter.
3.2 The base model of contracts
Consider a classic Hotelling market. There are two platforms (1 and 2) in the market. The
two companies are located at the two endpoints, with platform 1 at point 0 and platform
2 at point 1, as illustrated in Figure 3.2.1. There are two sellers and a continuum of
consumers in the market, the latter are evenly distributed along the unit section. A
platform provider provides a product or service to both sellers and consumers (e.g.,
manufactures a console, telephone, or operates a mall) that is assumed to have zero
marginal cost of production. Sellers produce their products for these platforms (for
example, they make video games, develop applications, or operate stores where they sell
their products). It is assumed that the marginal cost of manufacturing these products is
also zero.





Consumers buy qi,j quantities of sellers’ (i = 1, 2) platform-specific products after
entering each platform (j = 1, 2). They have to pay a non-negative price of pi for
these products. Consumption of platform-specific products affects the benefits realized
by consumers through multiple channels. On the one hand, their consumption directly
increases the realizable utility. On the other hand, depending on the relationship between
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the sellers’ products, they can increase, decrease, or even leave the level of utility achieved
unchanged. The relationship between the products is represented by a parameter φ, which
can take a value between −1 and 1 (φ ∈ (−1, 1)). If φ < 0, the products complement
each other, and the degree of complementarity decreases as φ increases. If there is a
complementary relationship between the platform-specific products, the consumer benefit
increases by φqi,jq−i,j if qi,j quantities were purchased from seller i’s product and q−i,j
quantities from seller −i’s product. If φ > 0, there is a substitution relationship between
the products and the degree of substitution increases as φ increases. If the products are
substitutes, the realized benefit to the consumer is reduced by φqi,jq−i,j when purchasing
a platform-specific product with qi,j and q−i,j quantities. If φ = 0, then the two platform-
specific products are independent of each other, and there is no additional effect through
the second channel following the consumption of the platform-specific products.
The third channel through which the consumption of platform-specific products
affects the utility of the consumer is the network effect typical of two-sided markets. In
the model, this is embodied by a parameter b and is realized in the wake of the purchased
platform-specific products. If a consumer has purchased qi,j and q−i,j quantities of a
platform-specific product on platform j, then the benefit changes with b (qi,j + q−i,j).
As discussed in the introduction, this network effect can be both positive and negative,
depending on the activity of the sellers as well as the preference of the consumers. As a
result, the network effect parameter is assumed to be −1 < b < 1.
Platforms charge consumers a fee of p0,j for the subscription. However, as it was seen
in the literature review, this subscription fee may also cover the provision of discounts, so
no restrictions were made on its value. Owning the product of the platforms generates a
benefit of vk > 0 for the consumers. It reduces the utility of consumers if they are not
connected to a platform with an ideal location for them, which is embodied in the travel
cost expressed as a linear function of the distance between the consumer’s location and
the platform of her choice. Based on these, if a consumer at a distance d chooses platform
1, her utility decreases by td, while if she enters platform 2, t (1− d) is the extent of utility
reduction. Travel cost is assumed to be non-negative.
Based on the above, the benefit of the consumer at point x, if she enters platform
1, can be given by the function
U1 (p0,1, p1, q1,1, p2, q2,1) = u (p1, q1,1, p2, q2,1)− tx− p0,1, (3.2.1)
while if she prefers platform 2,
U2 (p0,2, p1, q1,2, p2, q2,2) = u (p1, q1,2, p2, q2,2)− t(1− x)− p0,2 (3.2.2)
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is the utility function. In both cases,




(q1,j)2 + (q2,j)2 + φq1,jq2,j
)
−
p1q1,j − p2q2,j + b (q1,j + q2,j)
and j = 1, 2.4
Sellers must sign a contract when joining the platforms. In these contracts offered,
the platforms include a two-part tariff. On the one hand, sellers have to pay a franchise
fee wi,j for transactions with consumers. If seller i sold qi,j quantities of products to
consumers on platform j, she then pays an amount of wi,jqi,j to the platform. On the
other hand, the contract also includes a fixed access fee, denoted fi,j in the model, which
the seller pays in a lump sum upon connection.
As we are interested in the pricing impact of the offered contracts in this chapter,
as well as the incentives of the platforms, no restrictions were made on the location of
the sellers, they can be located at any point in the section. That is why the sellers’ travel
costs were chosen to zero.
Based on the above, the sellers’ profit function can be written as follows:
πi (pi, qi,1, qi,2, wi,1, wi,2, fi,1, fi,2) = (pi − wi,1)x0,1qi,1 + (pi − wi,2) ·
(1− x0,2) qi,2 − fi,1 − fi,2, (3.2.3)
where x0,1 and (1− x0,2) denote the number of subscribers to platforms 1 and 2, respective-
ly.5
Note that although two sellers are operating in the market, the market is still two-
sided, as the number of consumers entering the platform affects the ability of each seller
to generate profit. That is, the network effect occurs not only on the side of consumers
but also on the side of sellers.
The platforms, therefore, generate revenue from the subscription fee charged to
consumers and through the contracts offered to sellers. If platform 1 set a subscription
fee of p0,1 for the connected consumers and offered the sellers contracts containing the
(w1,1, f1,1) and (w2,1, f2,1) menus, then its profit function can be written in the form of
π1 (w1,1, f1,1, w2,1, f2,1, p0,1) = x0,1 (p0,1 + w1,1q1,1 + w2,1q2,1) + f1,1 + f2,1. (3.2.4)
4See Vives (2001, pp.143-183.)
5Note that for the marginal consumer of the two platforms, a deviation is allowed, i.e., the consumer
at point x0,1 is not necessarily the same as the consumer at point x0,2.
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For platform 2, the profit function takes the form
π2 (w1,2, f1,2, w2,2, f2,2, p0,2) = (1− x0,2) (p0,2 + w1,2q1,2 + w2,2q2,2) + f1,2 + f2,2. (3.2.5)
In the following, a three-period game is examined. In the first period, sellers decide
whether to enter only one platform or join both. In the second period, the platforms
will offer a contract to sellers as well as set a subscription fee for consumers. The sellers
then decide whether to accept the offered contracts. Then consumers, by observing how
many sellers have joined a given platform and what subscription fees have been set, decide
whether to enter the market and, if so, to which platform. Finally, in the third period,
sellers determine the price of their products and consumers decide how many products
they want to buy at those prices.
The structure of the game is justified by the fact that consumers typically use the
platform’s product over several periods, during which time sellers develop more and more
platform-specific products. For example, if a consumer buys a game console, she will
purchase compatible games not only when purchasing the game console but also at a
later date. And the price of these is not taken into account when buying the console.
Due to its sequential nature, the game is solved by backward induction, thus, in
the case of public contracts, the aim is to define the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium,
while in the case of private contracts the aim is to define the symmetric perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, taking into account the beliefs formed by the actors regarding behavior other
than equilibrium.
3.3 Public contracts
3.3.1 The model of single-homing sellers
Consider first the case where sellers in the first period decided to enter only one platform.
Namely, seller 1 joins platform 1, while seller 2 joins platform 2. Consumers will only buy
a product from one platform if they are interested.
Suppose platforms charge a subscription fee of p0,j (j = 1, 2) and sellers charge
a price of pi for their products (i = 1, 2). Consumers connected to the platform have
to decide on the quantity of platform-specific products they want to buy at the prices
charged. Based on consumer utility maximization, the individual demand for the product
of seller i on platform j is given by the function
qi,j (pi) = 1 + b− pi. (3.3.1)
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If x0,1 consumers signed up for platform 1 and 1−x0,2 for platform 2, then the total
demand for seller 1’s product on platform 1 is
D1,1 (p1) = x0,1q1,1,
while demand for seller 2’s product on platform 2 is
D2,2 (p2) = (1− x0,2) q2,2.
In addition to the above demands, the profit function of sellers given in (3.2.3) takes
the following form:
π1 (p1, q1,1, w1,1, f1,1) = (p1 − w1,1)x0,1q1,1 − f1,1 (3.3.2)
π2 (p2, q2,2, w2,2, f2,2) = (p2 − w2,2) (1− x0,2) q2,2 − f2,2 (3.3.3)
Sellers optimally set a price for which it is true that
∂πi
∂pi
= 0 ∀i = 1, 2.
As a solution to the above profit maximization problems, equilibrium prices as a function
of franchise fees can be written in the form of
p1 (w1,1) =




1 + b+ w2,2
2 . (3.3.5)
Given the prices, individual demands for platform-specific products as a function of
franchise fees based on (3.3.1) are:
q1,1 (w1,1) =
1 + b− w1,1
2 (3.3.6)
q2,2 (w2,2) =
1 + b− w2,2
2 (3.3.7)
Next, let us turn to the analysis of the second period. Because symmetrical solutions
are looked for, and the content of the contracts is known, it is not worthwhile for platforms
to set different franchise fees. Suppose platform j sets a higher franchise fee for sellers
who want to join it than its competitor. Since the content of the contracts is known to
everyone, including the sellers, they will decide to enter a platform with a lower franchise
48
fee. As the sellers thus exit the platform j, consumer demand for its services will also
decline. As a result, platform j reduces the franchise fee included in the contract to the
same level as that set by its competitor. Now suppose platform j chooses to set a higher
franchise fee for the seller i and a lower franchise fee for the seller −i. In this case, seller i
may choose not to sign the contract offered to him, which would also lead to a reduction in
demand on the consumer side. Furthermore, discrimination between the two sellers would
be a competition concern. Therefore, it is a rational assumption that for all platforms
(j = 1, 2) and all sellers (i = 1, 2), wi,j = w. Considering this, as well as the level of
subscription fees charged by the platforms, the utility of the consumer at point x if she
subscribes to platform 1 is
U1 (w, p0,1) = vk +
(1 + b− w)2
8 − tx− p0,1, (3.3.8)
and if she subscribes to platform 2, then it is
U2 (w, p0,2) = vk +
(1 + b− w)2
8 − t(1− x)− p0,2. (3.3.9)
To determine the demand for the platforms’ products, it is necessary to specify the
location of consumers who are indifferent to connection and absence. Consumers with x
locations for whom x ≤ x0,1 holds, where x0,1 is the location of the indifferent consumer
who is indifferent to whether or not to join platform 1, will subscribe to platform 1. While
consumers for whose location x ≥ x0,2 holds, where x0,2 is the location of the consumer
indifferent between platform 2 and the absence, enter platform 2. In the case of indifferent
consumers, it is true that their realized utility is zero, i.e., the utilities given in (3.3.8)
and (3.3.9) must be equal to zero. Based on these, the marginal consumers are located
at points
x0,1 (w, p0,1) =








x0,2 (w, p0,2) = 1−







It is worthwhile for sellers to connect to each platform if the conditions f1,1 ≤
x0,1 (p1 − w1,1) q1,1 and f2,2 ≤ (1− x0,2) (p2 − w2,2) q2,2 are met for the fixed access fee to
be paid. Because sellers only enter one platform and contracts are public, the platforms
set the access fee so that no profit is left to the sellers, i.e., f1,1 = x0,1 (p1 − w1,1) q1,1
and f2,2 = (1− x0,2) (p2 − w2,2) q2,2 are met. Based on these, the profit functions of the
platforms given in (3.2.4) and (3.2.5) can be further simplified and written in the following
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form:
π1 (w, p0,1) = x0,1 (w, p0,1) (p0,1 + p1 (w,w) q1,1 (w,w)) (3.3.12)
π2 (w, p0,2) = (1− x0,2 (w, p0,2)) (p0,2 + p2 (w,w) q2,2 (w,w)) (3.3.13)
The platforms set subscription fees and franchise fees for which it is true that
∂πj
∂p0,j




= 0 ∀j = 1, 2,
while the condition x0,1 + x0,2 ≤ 1 holds.
As a result of the above optimization task, the following equilibrium is obtained
with the use of public contracts when sellers are connected to only one platform.
Proposition 3. In a duopolistic two-sided market where platforms are located at the two
endpoints, seller 1 is on platform 1 and seller 2 is on platform 2, while consumers are only
present on their preferred platforms and contracts are public, the following equilibrium is
established while allowing a market that is not fully covered: the platforms optimally set
a franchise fee of
w = 13
(










(1 + b)2 + 2vk
)
. (3.3.15)




















quantities of platform-specific products.
x0,1 =
(1 + b)2 + 8
√
(1 + b)2 + 8b
√
(1 + b)2 + 18vk
36t , (3.3.18)
consumers will join platform 1, while
x0,2 = 1− x0,1 (3.3.19)
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consumers enter platform 2. Then the platforms realize a profit of
πj =
(
(1 + b)2 + 8
√
(1 + b)2 + 8b
√
(1 + b)2 + 18vk
)2
1296t , (3.3.20)
while the consumers realize a surplus of
CS = − 11296t
(
65 + 65b4 + 16
√












































For Proposition 3 to be the equilibrium, the vk > 118 (7 + 14b+ 7b
2) condition should
hold.
In the light of Proposition 3, it can be concluded with the help of comparative
statics that as the network effect increases, the franchise fee optimally set by the platforms
decreases, which represents a non-positive value for all possible parameter values. That
is, the platforms attract sellers with discounts when using public contracts. In contrast,
consumer subscription fees provide a positive value that increases as the network effect
increases and the utility generated by the platform’s product increases. In addition to
public contracts, consumers receive platform-specific products for free, and demand for
them increases with the increasing network effect.
The number of subscribers shows that while consumers have been allowed to stay
away from the market, the platforms set the subscription fee, franchise fee, and access fee
in such a way that their markets converge and it is not worthwhile for any consumer to
decide not to enter.
The higher the network effect, the more consumers value the platform’s product,
and the lower the travel cost, the greater the profit that can be realized by the platforms.
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√
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The increase of the network effect increases the realizable surplus if the conditions
t >







The partial derivative of consumer surplus with respect to the realizable benefit of
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(1 + b)2 + 8b
√
(1 + b)2 − 36t+ 18vk
36t
Based on these, the increase of the direct benefit increases the surplus that can be realized
by the consumers connected to the platforms if the conditions
t >
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Based on these, the increase in the travel cost for all
t >
(









reduces the surplus that can be realized by the consumers connected to the platforms.
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3.3.2 The model of multi-homing sellers
Now let’s turn to the case where sellers decide to enter both platforms. In this case, the
effect of the relationship between the two products will also appear on the consumer side,
which is embodied in the parameter φ in the model, as both platform-specific products
can now be purchased.
Based on the solution of the system of equations formed by the first-order conditions
resulting from the maximization of consumer utility, at a given price pi for platform-
specific products, there is a demand of
qi,j (p−i) =
2 (1 + b− p−i)
2 + φ (3.3.22)
for all i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2. However, expression (3.3.22) can only be a function of the
individual demand of consumers if the condition pi = p−i is satisfied, that is, the prices
of platform-specific products are optimally equal.
The total demand for seller i’s product on platform 1 will be x0,1qi,1, while on
platform 2 it will be (1− x0,2) qi,2. Taking these into account, the sellers maximize the
profit function described in (3.2.3) with respect to the prices, from which it follows that
the sellers set the following prices in equilibrium:
p1 (w1,1, w1,2) =
1 + b+ w1,2 + w1,1x0,1 − w1,2x0,2
2 (3.3.23)
p2 (w2,1, w2,2) =
1 + b+ w2,2 + w2,1x0,1 − w2,2x0,2
2 (3.3.24)
Thus, individual demand for platform-specific products, as a function of franchise
fees, can be written in the following form for multi-homing:
qi,j (wi,1, wi,2) =
1 + b− wi,2 (1− x0,2)− wi,1x0,1
2 + φ (3.3.25)
Because the contracts are still public, as it was seen in the previous model, the
platforms charge the same franchise fees to the sellers who join them. Based on these,
wi,j = w still exists for all platforms (j = 1, 2) and all sellers (i = 1, 2). Taking this into
account, as well as the subscription fees of p0,j set by the platforms in the second period,
the utility of the consumer at point x will be
U1 (w, p0,1) = vk +
(1 + b− w)2
2 (2 + φ) − tx− p0,1 (3.3.26)
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if she enters platform 1 and
U2 (w, p0,2) = vk +
(1 + b− w)2
2 (2 + φ) − t(1− x)− p0,2 (3.3.27)
if she enters platform 2.
Now let us turn to the examination of the second period and determine the location
of the indifferent consumers. The consumer who is indifferent between connecting to
platform 1 and absence, i.e. the utility in (3.3.26) is zero, is located at point
x0,1 (w, p0,1) =
(1 + b− w)2






While the consumer who is indifferent between platform 2 and absenteeism, i.e., the utility
defined by (3.3.27) will be zero, is found at
x0,2 (w, p0,2) = 1−
(1 + b− w)2






Since the market is still allowed not to be fully covered, and because sellers are present
on both platforms, consumers will join only one platform, the condition x0,1 + x0,2 ≤ 1
holds.
With the fixed access fee specified in the contract offered to the sellers, the platforms
continue to earn their total realized profit, i.e., the conditions fi,1 = x0,1 (pi − wi,1) qi,1 and
fi,2 = (1− x0,2) (pi − wi,2) qi,2 continue to be met for all i. Taking these, in addition to the
determined subscription fees of p0,j for consumers, the profit functions of the platforms
take the following form:
π1 (w, p0,1) = x0,1 (w, p0,1) [p0,1 + p1 (w,w) q1,1 (w,w) +
p2 (w,w) q2,1 (w,w)] (3.3.30)
π2 (w, p0,2) = (1− x0,2 (w, p0,2)) [p0,2 + p1 (w,w) q1,2 (w,w) +
p2 (w,w) q2,2 (w,w)] (3.3.31)
Thus, at the beginning of the second period, the platforms maximize the profit
functions given in (3.3.30) and (3.3.31) in terms of franchise fees as well as subscription
fees. As a result of this optimization, the following equilibrium is obtained for public
contracts if sellers opted for multi-homing in the first period.
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Proposition 4. In a duopolistic two-sided market where platforms are located at the
endpoints, sellers join both platforms, while consumers only join their preferred platform,
and contracts are public, the following equilibrium will emerge allowing a market that is
not fully covered: the platforms optimally charge a franchise fee of
w =




and a subscription fee of
p0,j =
(1 + b)2
2 + φ +
vk
2 . (3.3.33)


















3 (2 + φ) (3.3.35)
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+ 9 (2 + φ) vk
18t (2 + φ) , (3.3.36)
while the number of consumers joining platform 2 is
x0,2 = 1− x0,1. (3.3.37)
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324t (2 + φ)2
. (3.3.38)
Consumers entering the platforms realize a consumer surplus of
CS = − 1
324t (2 + φ)2
(
260 + 260b4 + 64
√
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For Proposition 4 to be the equilibrium, the vk > 14+28b+14b
2
18+9φ condition should hold.
It can be seen that the franchise fee set by the platforms is still a function of the
network effect, its strengthening increases the amount of support provided to sellers.
Consumers continue to pay a positive fee for connection, which increases with the streng-
thening of the network effect, the increase in the utility generated by the platforms’
product, and, in this case, the increasing complementarity of the products. Consumers will
continue to have access to platform-specific products free of charge, while their demand
for them will be increased not only by the increase in network effect but also by the
strengthening of the complementarity of products.
Platforms continue to set franchise fees and fixed access fees for sellers, and connection
fees for consumers so that their markets converge, meaning it is still not worthwhile for
any consumer to choose to stay away from the market.
The profits that can be realized by platforms increase if the network effect is
strengthening, the direct benefits generated by their product are increasing, travel cost is
decreasing, and if the complementary nature of the platform-specific products is streng-
thening. For consumers connected to the platforms, the strengthening of the network
effect only increases their realizable surplus if the conditions
t >
16 (1 + b)2
9 (2 + φ)
and
14 (1 + b)2
9 (2 + φ) < vk <
−2 (1 + b)2 + 2t (2 + φ)
2 + φ
hold.
An increase in the utility generated by the platform product and an increase in the
complementarity of platform-specific products will also increase the surplus that can be
realized by consumers if the above two conditions are met. Finally, an increase in travel










14 (1 + b)2
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3.3.3 The comparison of the two models
In this subsection, the models of single-homing and multi-homing sellers are compared.
For the evaluation of the equilibria, vk = 100 was set, i.e. consumers value the platform’s
product for 100.
It has been seen in the previous two subsections that, regardless of the sellers’
decision, in equilibrium, the platforms charge them the same franchise fee, which covers
the provision of support.
In contrast, consumers have to pay to join the platform. Figure 3.3.1 shows how
this magnitude evolves for the two models. It can be concluded that if companies entered
both platforms in the first period, consumers will be forced to pay a higher connection fee.
This can be explained mainly by the increase in network effect: consumers are willing to
pay more for joining the platform, so platforms increase the fee charged to the consumer
side and thus achieve higher profits. However, with a negative network effect, the amount
paid at entry is lower than if there is a strong positive network effect on the consumer side.
In terms of the relationship between platform-specific products, platforms charge a high
entry fee for complementary products, while as the substitutability, i.e. the competition
between sellers, intenzifies, the subscription fee charged decreases.
Figure 3.3.1: The connection fee for single-homing and multi-homing
Demand for platform-specific products is significantly affected by the relationship
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between the products. If the products complement each other, consumer demand will be
higher if both products are available to them on that platform. While if they substitute
each other, the demand for them will be higher with single-homing.
The price of the platform-specific products is zero in both models, i.e. consumers
connected to the platforms receive the sellers’ products made for the platforms free of
charge.
Figure 3.3.2: Demand for platform-specific products for single-homing and multi-homing
The profit that can be realized by the platforms is the highest in the case of
multi-homing sellers when the products are complements and gradually decreases as the
substitutability strengthens. The lower the travel cost, the higher the profit that can be
realized by the platform. Furthermore, as a result of the increase in the network effect,
the platform will be able to generate increasing profits due to the increase in the fee that
can be charged for connection.
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Figure 3.3.3: Profit of platforms for single-homing and multi-homing
Consumer surplus is the highest when sellers are present on both platforms and
complements are available in the market, while with single-homing, they realize the
smallest surplus by joining the platform. Both the increase of travel costs and the network
effect increase the realizable surplus for consumers.
Figure 3.3.4: Consumer surplus in the case of single-homing and multi-homing
3.4 Private contracts
3.4.1 The model of multi-homing sellers
From now on, the platforms offer private contracts to sellers, meaning that neither the
consumers nor the competitor are aware of the content of these contracts. The goal is
to define a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium that provides an idea of how actors
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shape their beliefs when they experience behavior that deviates from the equilibrium on
the part of the platform.
Let p∗0 be the subscription fee charged by the platforms to consumers in symmetric
perfect Bayesian equilibrium, w∗ correspondingly the franchise fee offered to sellers in the
optimum, and f ∗ the contractual fixed access fee. If consumers find that the subscription
fee is not the expected optimum, i.e. p0,j 6= p∗0, they conclude that the platforms deviated
from the optimal path. This deviation will affect the profitability of the sellers and
thus their willingness to join. Therefore, consumers expect that the difference in the
subscription fee will result in a change in the fixed access fee and/or in the franchise fee
included in the contracts. In this model, just like in Llanes and Ruiz-Aliseda (2015),
consumers believe that the deviation in the subscription fee causes a change in the access
fee offered to the sellers and leaves the franchise fee unchanged. Because the difference
would affect sellers’ willingness to enter, but this effect does not appear, it is a rational
assumption on the part of the consumers. This belief is called weak passive belief.6
Due to the unchanged strategy of consumers, the off-the-equilibrium subscription
fees do not carry additional information to the sellers about the content of the contracts,
so sellers’ beliefs in this regard will also be passive. By contrast, sellers have cautious
beliefs about the offered contracts, which means that the seller receiving the contract
offer assumes that the platform has made a contract offer to the other seller in order to
maximize its profit. These beliefs are determined by the franchise fee and by the fixed
access fee offered in the contract, and the seller receiving this offer can perfectly predict
what kind of offer the platform has made to the other seller, i.e. how the platform has
deviated from its optimal behavior.
It is also assumed that the sellers with cautious beliefs presume that the other seller
may have similar beliefs and that the platforms are not intended to exclude sellers from
the market offering private contracts.
In this subsection, therefore, it is examined what happens if the contracts offered to
the sellers can only be observed by the seller who gets an offer from the platforms, that
is, neither consumers nor competitors are aware of their content. This means that, in the
second period, seller i knows only the subscription fees (p0,j), the number of consumers
subscribed to the platforms (x0,1, (1− x0,2)), and the franchise (wi,j) and fixed access fees
(fi,j) included in the contracts offered to her.
Let B (ŵ) be the belief of seller i about the franchise fee paid by the seller −i. Since
6According to Llanes and Ruiz-Aliseda (2015), the use of standard passive beliefs would not change
the outcome, but the interpretation would be difficult. In this case, consumers assume f∗ and w∗, and
if they find that sellers continue to accept the offered contracts, they conclude that contracts have been
accepted which result in a loss for sellers while facing lower demand on the platform than in equilibrium.
(Llanes and Ruiz-Aliseda , 2015, p.13.)
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symmetric equilibrium is examined, it is irrelevant which seller receives the unexpected
contract offer in the model, the only stipulation regarding the belief is that in the optimum
it should be equal with the equilibrium franchise fee, that is B (w∗) = w∗. This is because
sellers form cautious beliefs. It is assumed that seller i’s belief does not depend on the
paid fixed access fee, nor on the subscription fees charged by the platforms to consumers.
The latter has no signal value, it does not carry additional information.
Based on the above, the derivation of the model is the same as the first model up to
equation (3.3.24), the determination of the optimal prices of platform-specific goods. Let
pi (wi,j) be the strategy of seller i in case of receiving an unexpected contract offer that
includes the (wi,j, fi,j) menu, and if she already knows the subscription fees p0,j.
The seller’s task remains unchanged, maximizing the profit function (3.2.3) with
respect to pi, on the basis of which he optimally determines the following price:
pi (wi,1, wi,2) =
1 + b+ wj,2 + (1 + b+ wj,1)x0,1 − (1 + b+ wj,2)x0,2
2(1 + x0,1 − x0,2
(3.4.1)
In the second period, consumers expect a franchise fee w∗ due to passive beliefs,
regardless of the subscription fees p0,j set by the platforms. Therefore, consumers believe
that sellers will charge
p∗i =
1 + b+ w∗
2 (3.4.2)
for their products in the equilibrium. Based on these, the expected utility of consumers
if entering platform 1 will be
U1 (w∗, p0,1) = vk +
(1 + b− w∗)2
2 (2 + φ) − tx− p0,1, (3.4.3)
while those who subscribe to platform 2 realize
U2 (w∗, p0,2) = vk +
(1 + b− w∗)2
2 (2 + φ) − t(1− x)− p0,2. (3.4.4)
Based on (3.4.3), the location of the consumer who is indifferent to joining platform 1
and staying away from the market is at point
x0,1 (w∗, p0,1) =
(1 + b− w∗)2




From (3.4.4), it follows that the consumer indifferent between platform 2 and the absence
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can be characterized by the
x0,2 (w∗, p0,2) = 1−
(1 + b− w∗)2





Based on equation (3.3.24), equation (3.3.22), i.e. the demand for the sellers’
platform-specific product, can also be written in the following form:
qi,j =
2 (pi (wi,j)− wi,j)
2 + φ (3.4.7)
It is also known that the platforms charge sellers an access fee that leaves them with
no profit, i.e. fi,1 = x0,1 (pi − wi,1) qi,1 and fi,2 = (1− x0,2) (pi − wi,2) qi,2 conditions hold
for each i. These can be expressed, given the equation (3.4.7), in the form of
fi,1 = x0,1
2 (pi (wi,1)− wi,1)2
2 + φ (3.4.8)
and
fi,2 = (1− x0,2)
2 (pi (wi,2)− wi,2)2
2 + φ . (3.4.9)
The platforms can perfectly predict the volume sold by the two sellers in the third
period. Their goal is to maximize their profits, taking into account the subscription fee of
p0,j charged to consumers and the contracts offered to sellers which include the (wi,j, fi,j)
menus. Based on (3.4.5) and (3.4.6), the profit functions of platforms can be given in the
form of
π1 (w1,1, f1,1, w2,1, f2,1, p0,1) = x0,1 (w∗, p0,1) (p0,1 + w1,1q1,1 (p1(w1,1), p2(w2,1)) +
w2,1q2,1 (p1(w1,1), p2(w2,1))) + f1,1 + f2,1 (3.4.10)
and
π2 (w1,2, f1,2, w2,2, f2,2, p0,2) = (1− x0,2 (w∗, p0,2)) (p0,2 + w1,2q1,2 (p1(w1,2), p2(w2,2)) +
w2,2q2,2 (p1(w1,2), p2(w2,2))) + f1,2 + f2,2. (3.4.11)
Since both sellers are characterized by cautious beliefs, seller i assumes the other
seller has received such an offer from the platforms that B (wi,j), i.e., her belief maximizes
the profits of the platforms. Suppose seller 2 receives an unexpected contract offer from
the platforms. As she can be characterized by cautious belief, she concludes that the
62
other seller received a contract offer with a B (w2,j) franchise fee. If the belief of seller 2,
as well as equations (3.3.22), (3.4.8), and (3.4.9) are substituted into the profit functions
given in (3.4.10) and (3.4.11), the objective functions will take the following forms:
π1 (w1,1, f1,1, w2,1, f2,1, p0,1) = x0,1 (w∗, p0,1) (p0,1 + w1,1q1,1 (p1(w1,1), p2(w2,1)) +






π2 (w1,2, f1,2, w2,2, f2,2, p0,2) = (1− x0,2 (w∗, p0,2)) (p0,2 + w1,2q1,2 (p1(w1,2), p2(w2,2)) +





Since the belief of seller 2 regarding the franchise fee of the other seller maximizes
the profit of the platforms, the first-order conditions of the platforms can be determined
from the partial derivative of the above profit functions with respect to w2,j:
∂πj
∂w2,j
= 1 + b− 2w2,j −B (w2,j) + (1 + b− w2,j)B
′ (w2,j)
2 + φ +
4 (−B (w2,j) + p2 (w2,j)) (−B′ (w2,j) + p′2 (w2,j))
2 + φ (3.4.14)
Suppose that for any w2,j there exists a solution to the first-order conditions. Due
to the symmetry, it is also assumed that for the two platforms it is not worthwhile to
charge different franchise fees to the same seller and that due to cautious beliefs
p (w) = Φ + Σw (3.4.15)
and
B (w) = Γ + Θw. (3.4.16)
According to Rey and Vergé (2004), when determining symmetric perfect Bayesian
equilibria is the goal, in the case when both prices and beliefs can be expressed as
polynomials, one cannot make a mistake if the investigations are limited to affine functions.
In the light of this, the system of equations given by the first-order conditions of sellers in
(3.3.24) and the first-order conditions in (3.4.14) resulting from the optimization of the
platforms taking into account the beliefs can already be solved.
The first-order conditions of the platforms, that is, equation (3.4.14) can be written
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as
1 + 4ΦΣ + Θ− 4ΦΘ + b (1 + Θ) + Γ (4Θ− 1− 4Σ) +
2
(
2Σ2 − 1−Θ− 4ΣΘ + 2Θ2
)
w2,j = 0 (3.4.17)
based on (3.4.15) and (3.4.16), while the first-order condition of sellers, i.e. equation
(3.3.24), can be given in form of
1 + b− 2Φ + (1− 2Σ)w2,j = 0. (3.4.18)
Since the first-order conditions (3.4.17) and (3.4.18) should be satisfied for all w2,j,
it is obtained that, in equilibrium, the following four conditions must be met:
1 + 4ΦΣ + Θ− 4ΦΘ + b (1 + Θ) + Γ (4Θ− 1− 4Σ) = 0, (3.4.19)
2
(
2Σ2 − 1−Θ− 4ΣΘ + 2Θ2
)
= 0, (3.4.20)
1 + b− 2Φ = 0, (3.4.21)
and
1− 2Σ = 0. (3.4.22)
Based on (3.4.22) the value of Σ can be clearly determined, Σ = 12 , while based on









while based on condition (3.4.19), the value of Γ can already be given:









An interesting result is that the value of the above four parameters is not affected by the
relationship between platform-specific products in the market, in contrast to the results
of Llanes and Ruiz-Aliseda (2015), who, in the case of a monopolistic platform, obtained
beliefs depending on the relationship between platform-specific products as a result.
For beliefs, as described above, B (w∗) = w∗ should hold, which is the basis for the
following proposition.
Proposition 5. In a Hotelling-type duopolistic two-sided market where platforms are
located at the two endpoints, sellers are present on both platforms and consumers are
present exclusively on their preferred platform, while contracts are private, the equilibrium
will be the following allowing for not fully covered market: the equilibrium franchise fees
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are
w∗ = Γ1−Θ (3.4.23)
and the equilibrium subscription fees are
p∗0 =
1
4 (2 + φ) (Θ− 1)2
(
Γ2 (1− 8 (Σ− 1) Σ) + 2Γ (1 + b+ 4Φ (2Σ− 1)) (Θ− 1) +
(





Sellers ask for a price of
p∗ = Φ− ΓΣΘ− 1 (3.4.25)
for their products, for which they can sell
q∗i,j =
2 (Φ (Θ− 1)− Γ (Σ− 1))
(2 + φ) (Θ− 1) (3.4.26)
products. The number of consumers that join platform 1 will be
x∗0,1 =
1
4t (2 + φ) (Θ− 1)2
(
Γ2 (1 + 8 (Σ− 1) Σ) + 2Γ (1 + b+ 4Φ (1− Σ)) (Θ− 1) +
(





while the number of consumers that enter platform 2 will be
x∗0,2 = 1− x∗0,1. (3.4.28)
In this case, platforms realize a profit of
π∗ = 1
16t (2 + φ)2 (Θ− 1)4
(
Γ2 (1 + 8 (Σ− 1) Σ) + 2Γ (1 + b+ 4Φ (1− 2Σ)) (Θ− 1) +
(





while the consumers realize a surplus of
CS∗ = 1
32t (2 + φ)2 (Θ− 1)4
(
Γ2 (1 + 8 (Σ− 1) Σ) + 2Γ (1 + b+ 4Φ (1− 2Σ)) (Θ− 1) +
(














Based on the above Proposition, the franchise fee offered by the platforms as well
as the price charged by the sellers depends only on the parameter b, which embodies the
network effect. However, the demand for platform-specific products and the subscription
fee charged by platforms are already affected by the parameter φ, which embodies the
relationship between the products, while the profit realized by the platforms and the
realizable surplus of consumers are also affected by the value of the t parameter represent-
ing travel costs. Equation (3.4.28) shows that on the consumer side, the market remains
fully covered. That is, platforms design contracts in such a way that their impact does
not lead to a reduction in consumer demand.
Let us also look graphically at the evolution of the equilibrium. To represent
equilibrium, vk was set to 100.
Figure 3.4.1: Evolution of the franchise fee as a function of the network effect
Figure 3.4.1 shows the evolution of the franchise fee using private contracts. It can
be seen that the franchise fee charged by the platforms increases as the network effect
increases. If there is a negative network effect in the market, the platforms are forced to
charge a lower franchise fee, while in case of a positive network effect they are able to set
a higher franchise fee. However, the fee charged is positive in all cases. That is, under
private contracts, sellers pay the platforms for each of their transactions, regardless of
whether the network effect in the market is positive or negative.
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Figure 3.4.2: Evolution of the price of platform-specific products as a function of the
network effect
The price of platform-specific products, like the franchise fee, also increases as the
network effect increases. It can also be seen that, in addition to the use of private
contracts, the price charged to consumers is positive. They have to pay a lower price
for platform-specific products with a negative network effect and a higher price with a
positive network effect.
Figure 3.4.3: Evolution of the subscription fee as a function of the network effect and
the relationship between the products
Based on Figure 3.4.3, the platform continues to set a positive subscription fee for
consumers. That is, in the case of private contracts, contrary to the findings in the
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literature, the platform does not offer discounts to consumers if a competitor is also
present in the market. The subscription fee is higher with a negative network effect and is
lower with a positive network effect. It can also be seen that consumers pay the least for
joining the platform for complementary products and the most for substitute products.
Figure 3.4.4: Evolution of demand for platform-specific products as a function of the
network effect and the relationship between products
According to Figure 3.4.4, the strengthening of the network effect increases the
demand for platform-specific products. If the prevailing network effect is negative, then
the demand for products manufactured for the platforms is lower, while with a positive
network effect it is higher. As the network effect for consumers was realized in the wake
of the products purchased, this result is not surprising. It can be seen that consumers
are looking for complementary products the most, as they then gain additional benefits
from consuming the product and pay the least for joining the platform, while demand for
substitute products is the lowest.
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Figure 3.4.5: Evolution of the profit of platforms as a function of the network effect, the
relationship between products, and the travel cost
Figure 3.4.5 shows the evolution of platforms’ profit. It can be stated that with
the strengthening of the network effect, the realizable profit increases, and the decrease
of travel costs has a similar effect. If the travel cost is high in the market and there
is a negative network effect, the platform has little or no ability to realize profits. If
complementary products are present in the market, the highest profit can be achieved.
Figure 3.4.6: Surplus of connected consumers as a function of the network effect, the
travel cost, and the relationship between products
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The realized surplus of consumers is the lowest in the case of a strong, negative
network effect and high travel costs, while it is the highest in the case of negligible travel
costs and positive network effect. That is, the consumer surplus increases as the network
effect increases and travel cost decreases. Consumers realize the highest surplus in the case
of complementary products because then the co-consumption of the products generates
additional benefits for them, and they pay the least for connecting to the platform.
3.5 Comparison of the model of public and private
contracts
In the following section, the results obtained for public and private contracts reported in
Proposition 4 and 5 are compared.
Figure 3.5.1 shows the evolution of the franchise fee with the use of public as well
as private contracts. It can be seen that the platforms changed their strategy in favor of
private contracts and imposed a positive franchise fee on the previously supported seller
segment. This result is consistent with the results of Armstrong and Wright (2007) and
Llanes and Ruiz-Aliseda (2015).
Figure 3.5.1: Evolution of the franchise fee as a function of the network effect
As a result of the franchise fee included in the contract, in addition to the use of
private contracts, consumers already pay a positive price to sellers for their products.
This also confirms in a duopolistic model framework the proposition by Llanes and Ruiz-
Aliseda (2015) that platforms include franchise fees in private contracts that ultimately
result in collusive pricing on the part of sellers.
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Figure 3.5.2: Evolution of the price of platform-specific products as a function of the
network effect
In the case of the subscription fee imposed on consumers based on Figure 3.5.3,
the platforms did not change their strategy, in contrast to the results of Llanes and Ruiz-
Aliseda (2015). Although the subscription fee for private contracts is lower than for public
contracts, consumers do not receive support in a duopolistic environment. Furthermore,
it can be stated that while in addition to public contracts, the fee charged for subscription
increases as the network effect strengthens, in the case of private contracts it decreases.
The largest discrepancy in the subscription fee is seen for complementary products, while
the smallest is for substitute products.
Figure 3.5.3: Evolution of the subscription fee as a function of the network effect and
the relationship between the products
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Figure 3.5.4 shows that in the case of public contracts, regardless of the relationship
between the products, the demand for platform-specific products is higher than in the case
of private contracts. Regardless of the type of contract, the highest demand is observed
for complementary products, while the lowest is observed for substitute products.
Figure 3.5.4: Evolution of the demand for platform-specific products as a function of the
network effect and the relationship between platform-specific products
Figure 3.5.5 shows the evolution of platforms’ profits. It can be concluded that
the use of public contracts results in a more favorable outcome for platforms than the
use of private contracts, regardless of the relationship between platform-specific products.
Platforms are able to realize the highest profit if the platform-specific products present in
the market complement each other, while if there is a substitution relationship between
them, lower profit can be achieved for them.
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Figure 3.5.5: Evolution of the platforms’ realized profit as a function of the network
effect, the relationship between platform-specific products, and the travel cost
In the case of the realized surplus of consumers, it can be stated that with a negative
network effect, consumers typically do better if the platforms use private contracts, as
shown in Figure 3.5.6. However, with the strengthening of the network effect and the
increase in travel costs, after a while, public contracts will become the preferred one. In
the case of complementary products, this occurs at a significant travel cost. It can also
be seen that if there is a positive network effect, the use of public contracts will become
the preferred outcome with lower travel costs. The realizable surplus is highest when
complementary products are available in the market, while it is lowest when platform-
specific products are substitutable.
Figure 3.5.6: Evolution of consumer surplus as a function of the network effect, the travel
cost, and the relationship between platform-specific products
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Overall, it is preferable for platforms to use public contracts for the model specifica-
tion reported in this chapter. In contrast, on the consumer side, there is a case where they
prefer private contracts because then their realized surplus exceeds their surplus available
under public contracts.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, the impact of public and private contracts were presented within the
framework of a duopolistic two-sided market. It has been seen that when using public
contracts, the profits of the platforms, as well as the surplus of consumers, are also the
highest when the sellers enter both platforms, regardless of the relationship between the
platform-specific products.
If the platforms were able to offer private contracts, on the one hand, their strategy
changed and positive franchise fees were set for previously supported sellers. This result
is consistent with the results of Armstrong and Wright (2007) and Llanes and Ruiz-
Aliseda (2015). On the consumer side, on the other hand, in contrast to the results of the
above two papers, the platforms did not offer discounts but continued to set a positive
subscription fee. However, this was lower for private contracts than for public contracts,
and the increase in network effect reduced the subscription fee charged to consumers,
while it increased it for public contracts. As a result of the above, consumers had already
to pay for platform-specific products previously available for free for private contracts.
The change in sellers’ pricing when the platforms offer private contracts was also reflected
in the monopolistic model of Llanes and Ruiz-Aliseda (2015). Contrary to the results of
this paper, however, the conclusion was made that sellers’ beliefs in the case of duopolistic
platforms do not depend on the relationship between platform-specific products.
Evaluating the models of public and private contracts from the point of view of
platforms and consumers, it was found that platforms always do better with the use of
public contracts, as their realized profits were higher. The question then arises as to why
the platforms still use private contracts. A potential response to this could be to use
them to give consumers a discount and thus attract them. But following the example of
Microsoft and Apple, they may aim to create a unique platform for which they want to
produce compatible products with exclusive programmers (sellers). This, on the one hand,
differentiates the service they provide and, on the other hand, gives them monopolistic
power in terms of those who join them. The practice of product differentiation with
exclusive contracts was proven in the case of traditional markets by Bakó (2012) and
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Bakó (2016). Consumers, on the other hand, preferred the case when platforms used
public contracts only at high travel costs. Conversely, if travel cost was moderate, the use
of private contracts became preferred on their part.
On the one hand, the above results highlighted that, in the case of two-sided markets,
platforms are typically encouraged to offer public contracts and attract as many sellers
as possible. On the other hand, from a consumer perspective, several factors play a role
in determining the desired outcome. The strongest factor was clearly the travel cost on
the consumer side: if the travel cost was low, they strongly preferred the case where the
platform offered private contracts to multi-homing sellers. In contrast, in the case of
high travel costs, the use of public contracts was preferred. This was due to the lower
subscription fee for private contracts, but also due to the fact that low travel cost can





Mixed duopoly in two-sided markets
4.1 Mixed duopolies in the literature
The state can choose from several strategies when regulating markets. It can choose
to levy a tax, introduce price regulation1, or create/purchase a company in a particular
market. In this chapter, the impact of the latter intervention is examined in the context
of two-sided markets, whereas different results have been obtained for these platforms,
both in terms of the need for regulation and its way.
If a state-owned company operates alongside a privately owned competitor in a given
market, we are talking about a mixed duopoly. Mixed duopolies have been at the center
of economic research since the late 1960s, and their literature has expanded greatly since
then. The first pioneering paper can be attributed to Merrill and Schneider (1966), who
first examined the short-term effects of the possibility of some companies being in public
hands and others in private hands within a given market. In the model they presented, the
state-owned company maximized the industry’s output under the restrictive assumptions
that its emergence would not generate losses for private firms and would not result in
a low price that would generate overdemand in the industry. The game took place in
a Stackelberg environment where companies decided on prices, the public company was
the Stackelberg leader, while the private companies were the Stackelberg followers. Three
pricing strategies are analyzed by the authors in the paper: the first is when the public
company meets the demand at a price it sets, and the private companies satisfy the
remaining demand at a monopolistic price. According to the second strategy, private
companies charge a lower price for their products than the price set by the state-owned
company and meet the demand at that price, or, if they are unable to do so, sell all their
products at that price. Finally, privately-owned companies could choose to set the same
1For example, it imposes a price floor to enhance competition. About the effect of price floor in the
case of traditional markets, see e.g. Bakó (2010)
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price as the state-owned company and share the market equally. For the state-owned
company, two pricing strategies were examined: it could use neutral or discriminatory
pricing. In addition, the impact of a state-owned company deciding on company size was
also examined. The authors concluded that in an oligopolistic environment, the emergence
of a state-owned company can result in a more favorable outcome – lower prices and higher
output. It was also pointed out that while the state-owned company cannot sell exclusively
to consumers with high reservation prices, the output of the industry will remain below
full capacity and the average price will be above the marginal cost.
In the case of state-owned companies, there is no consensus on the objective function,
but the maximization of the social surplus (consumer and producer surplus) has become
typical. Nett (1993) summarized the results obtained in the literature for homogeneous
products. He examined a total of five topics in his paper on mixed oligopolies: the
optimal pricing strategy of a state-owned company, the state-owned company as a tool
for regulation, the effect of cost functions in the literature on the resulting equilibria,
investment (incentive) contracts, and the relationship between strategic commitment
and market entry. A review of the literature has led the author to conclude that the
assumptions used in the papers substantially influence the results obtained in them, which
are typically contradictory.
For example, the optimal pricing used by a state-owned company depends on the
existence of a constraint: if the state-owned company does not face a constraint, marginal
cost pricing is the best strategy, while if it faces a zero profit condition, the price will
follow the modified Ramsey pricing formula. In general, however, marginal cost pricing
is not dominated by other pricing strategies.
The most controversial results have been achieved in the area of nationalization and
privatization. Furthermore, due to the condition of perfect information, Nett stressed that
the conclusions presented here should be treated with caution. In the papers examined,
the state could decide to set up a new company in a given market or to buy one of
the private companies. If the companies in the market can be characterized by unique
technology, then the social welfare is maximal if only a state-owned company is present
in the market. If the technology is characterized by declining returns to scale, more than
one company may appear on the market at optimum. Another influencing factor in terms
of results is the nature of competition between firms: under the assumption of Cournot
and Stackelberg, privatization affects the profits of the originally privately owned firm
and the privatized firm and social surpluses differently (Grau, 1990, as cited in Nett ,
1993). According to Nett’s review, under certain conditions, nationalization results in the
formation of a state monopoly in the long run (Cremer, Marchand, and Thisse, 1987, as
cited in Nett , 1993), while under other assumptions, it entails a decline in social welfare
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(De Fraja and DeIbono De Fraja - Delbono , 1989).
With the difference between the costs associated with the production, the authors
typically tried to capture efficiency. However, the results obtained on this issue have
been refuted by subsequent empirical analyzes. For example, De Fraja (1993)2 justified
the difference in costs between the public and the private company with the different
outcomes of the wage negotiations. Based on his results, the state-owned company pays
its employees higher wages than its privately held competitor, which would result in
the formation of a state monopoly in the long run. The above result is obvious from
Nett’s argument and can be illustrated with a contradiction. If the private firm can
be characterized by a higher fixed unit cost, then the public firm can be considered a
monopolist in the market. As a result, the private company gets rid of its employees
and withdraws from the market. However, this would also put workers and unions at a
disadvantage, so that can be no equilibrium outcome. On the other hand, a state-owned
company has to pay a positive wage to its employees due to the bargaining position of the
union, which creates an opportunity for private companies to enter. Subsequent empirical
analyzes also refuted De Fraja’s (1993) findings, as they showed that public wages are
typically lower than wages in the private sector. Another approach to explaining the
difference in cost is innovation. In an earlier paper, Nett examined the effect of innovation
(Nett, 1991, as cited in Nett , 1993), which results in an increase in the fixed cost of the
company performing the innovation, while a decrease in the variable cost. Based on the
obtained results, a state monopoly and a mixed duopoly can also be the equilibrium. In
the case of the latter, there is a scenario where the output of the private company will
be higher, while its average cost will be lower than that of the state-owned company.
However, this does not mean that the private company is more efficient. In addition, the
author also realized that if two state-owned firms compete in the market, the price is lower
and the welfare is higher than in a mixed duopolistic market. Finally, it was also found
that if companies maximize output rather than profit, destructive competition becomes
more likely to result, i.e., at least one company becomes unprofitable.
The use of incentive contracts typically arises as a solution to the principal-agent
problem. In the case of a mixed duopoly, the literature concludes according to Nett that
in the case of a principal-agent problem, there is an allocation in a mixed duopoly market
that qualifies as a Pareto improvement compared to the situation where the two owners
decided to issue their company. That is, the two owners offer managers contracts that do
not fully address the differences in interests. This results in a higher surplus for a mixed
duopoly based on Laffon (1986), as cited in Nett (1993) than for a private duopoly, where
a prisoner dilemma typically develops.
2Nett (1993) refers to an earlier version in his paper that was published in 1990.
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Finally, the relationship between strategic commitment and market deterrence was
also analyzed in the case of mixed duopolies. Based on the papers examined, Nett found
that there was a strong assumption as to whether or not the state-owned firm faced a
constraint. If there is no constraint on the state-owned company, the presence of the
state-owned company in the market deters private entrants, unless the latter can produce
at a lower cost (Fershtman , 1990). If, on the other hand, the state-owned company faces
a budget constraint, the private company can enter at symmetrical costs (Nett, 1990, as
cited in Nett , 1993). As a solution, a long-term strategic commitment on the part of the
state-owned company may arise, but this will not deter the entrant based on the results
either.
Based on Nett (1993), it can be concluded that the initial assumptions significantly
influence the results obtained. In addition to a review of the literature, Nett (1993) also
highlighted an interesting phenomenon in relation to mixed duopolies, which he called
the Cournot-Paradox in the wake of the Bertrand-Paradox. The Bertrand-Paradox arises
when duopolistic firms compete on price, do not face capacity constraints, and have
constant and symmetric average costs. In this case, the price will be optimally equal to
the average cost, i.e. companies will not make a profit. The Bertrand-Paradox also exists
in the case of mixed duopolies. If a Cournot competition develops in a mixed duopolistic
market, equilibrium output will give competitive output, i.e., the best answer for a given
technology will be equilibrium allocation. However, then only the state-owned company
will be present in the market and it will not be worthwhile for private companies to enter.
Nett outlined two solutions to this problem: either there should be declining returns
to scale in production, or the privately-owned company should produce at a lower cost.
In these cases, the Cournot-Paradox does not exist, it may be worthwhile for a private
company to enter the given market.
In the case of papers examining product differentiation, it can also be stated that,
depending on the assumptions, different results are obtained in terms of its extent and
its effect on optimal pricing. Matsumura and Matsushima (2003) examined the optimal
role of the state-owned company, the impact of price regulation, and the impact of the
privatization of the state-owned company in the context of the Stackelberg duopoly. They
were interested in whether, according to the literature, the state-owned company chooses
the role of the follower in the optimum in all cases, and how the introduction or abolition
of price regulation affects the location chosen by the companies and the market structure.
They examined a two-period model. In the first period the leader company chooses a
location, and then the follower observes this decision and determines its location. In
the second period, companies set their prices. The authors concluded that without price
regulation, the highest level of welfare is achieved when the public company is the leader
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and the private is the follower. Then the products are more differentiated than when
companies change roles. If companies were to seek to maximize profits, they would be
located at the two endpoints, however, the welfare achieved in this way is lower than in
the state leader – private follower case. If price regulation is introduced in the market,
the desired outcome in terms of welfare is where the private company is the Stackelberg
leader and the state company is the Stackelberg follower. Then the differentiation of
the products is the same as in the relevant case without price regulation. Conversely, if
the state-owned company acted as a leader with price regulation, homogeneous products
would be available on the market. Comparing the two desirable outcomes, Matsumura
and Matsushima came to the conclusion that higher social welfare could be achieved
without price regulation. The authors also examined the effect of simultaneous location
decision, for which there are several equilibria. If the expected pay-offs for this game are
the same as the pay-offs in the Stackelberg case when companies play their desired role
in the game, a single equilibrium occurs, however, in this case, the welfare is lower than
when companies sequentially decide on their location.
Ogawa (2006) examined the impact of product differentiation on companies’ capacity
decisions. Previously, the literature has assumed that products are perfect substitutes for
each other, in which case, the state-owned company chooses under-capacity at optimum,
while the private company chooses excess capacity optimally. On the one hand, the author
supported the results of the literature in the case of perfect substitutes, but in the case
of perfect complements, both companies decided to choose excess capacity.
In their paper, Kitahara and Matsumura (2013) presented a model for the effect
of product differentiation of mixed duopolies on equilibrium prices. It was examined
whether the phenomenon that occurs with inelastic demand also exists in the case of elastic
demand, namely that an increase in product differentiation leads to a decrease in price
competition. In addition, the impact of the privatization of the state-owned company was
examined and the model of Matsumura and Matsushima (2003) without price regulation
was also reproduced in the above environment. The authors came to the conclusion that
in the case of elastic demand, the decreasing differentiation of products can lead to a
loosening of competition. In addition, at optimum, the private company is too close
to the state-owned company, i.e., product differentiation in equilibrium will be too small
compared to the socially optimal case. The above results are robust with low privatization,
so product differentiation still lags behind the socially optimal, however, with large-scale
privatization, the opposite can be said. Thus, if the state becomes a minority owner in the
company it founded or sells it to the private sector, the two companies will be located as far
apart as possible, i.e., the degree of product differentiation will be higher than the socially
optimal level. Under the Stackelberg model, the results of Kitahara and Matsumura show
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that product differentiation will be lower under the assumption of elastic demand than
in the case of inelastic demand if the state-owned company is the leader in the model. In
contrast, in the case of welfare, despite decreasing differentiation, an increase is observed,
contrary to the respective results of Matsumura and Matsushima (2003). That is, with
elastic demand, the leading role of the state-owned company is significant. Finally, based
on the results of the privatization model, companies are located as far apart as possible
even in the case of elastic demand, which results in a decrease in welfare.
In the case of two-sided markets, the appearance of the state in each market is also
an important issue. The literature on this issue typically focuses on the media as well
as open-source platforms – the latter are not in state hands, but their behavior is very
similar to that of a state-owned company. With the spread of the Internet, open-source
platforms have become the focus of research. The most typical examples are operating
systems (Linux and Windows or Android and Apple iOS) and software (Open Office and
Microsoft Office, Firefox and Google Chrome). The analyzes focus on the diversity and
differentiation of the products available on the market, however, the approaches used to
capture them are varied.
González-Maestre and Martínez-Sánchez (2015) analyzed the impact of the platforms’
decision on quality and advertising and the emergence of a public actor in the broadcasting
industry. In addition, the impact on the quality and welfare of policies aimed at eliminating
advertising funding for public platforms has been examined.3 The authors presented three
models: the case of private, mixed, and “zero” duopoly.4 The impact of private and mixed
duopolies on welfare depends, based on the results, on the net direct impact of advertising
on welfare and the interaction between the degree of substitutability between platforms.
From a welfare comparison of the three models, it was found that at low travel costs, if
the rate of revenue per viewer and advertisement and the loss of revenue from viewers due
to ads (k) is sufficiently low, the zero duopoly, while if it is sufficiently high, the private
duopoly is desirable. For high travel costs, zero duopoly is the optimal system for low k,
mixed duopoly for medium-low and high k, and private duopoly for medium-high k is the
optimal system. For intermediate values of travel cost, a zero duopoly is desirable if k is
low, a private duopoly if k is medium, and a mixed duopoly if k is high.
Pires (2016) also analyzed the market for media service providers and examined
the claim that the emergence of a state-owned media service provider increases media
pluralism in the market. However, his results highlighted that this statement is not
3In France, for example, advertising on public TV was phased out and then taxed on private
broadcasters and telecommunications platforms to provide the resources needed to sustain public TV.
The same was done in Spain, but in some aspects, the advertising tax introduced in Hungary can be
included here, although the purpose was not to eliminate advertising on the state platform.
4The latter corresponds to the case where there are no ads on the state platform, hence the name
"zero".
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necessarily true, as the adjustment of news to readers’ political preferences, the intensity of
these political preferences, and the size of the advertising market significantly influence the
impact of a state-owned company’s appearance on social surplus. That is, the appearance
of the state with its own company in a given market is not necessarily a suitable regulatory
tool. This is due to the fact that in the media markets, in addition to price competition,
there is also competition between companies in terms of the information offered. As
media pluralism increases, price competition increases in the market, which a state-owned
company cannot always offset by its activities.
Open-source and proprietary platforms were the subjects of the research of Casade-
sus-Masanell and Llanes (2015). In the paper, the authors analyzed the incentives to
invest in the quality of platforms. They sought to answer the question of how the openness
of the platform affects investment in quality, what type of relationship can be observed
in terms of access and investment strategy, and how competition in a mixed duopolistic
environment affects access fees and investment in quality. Casadesus-Masanell and Llanes
have come to the conclusion that with the same number of developers and users, they are
investing more in the quality of the private platform. In contrast, open-source platforms
may benefit from limited developer access if, as a result of investing in platform quality,
developer revenue decreases as the number of applications increases. Then a lower number
of developers can result in a higher level of investment. These results are similar to
multiple users connect to the open-source platform, or when multiple developers connect
to the open-source platform, and investing in platform quality increases developer revenue
as the number of applications increases. If the proprietary platform becomes available
to one site free of charge, it will be less encouraged to invest in quality, as it will then
not be able to internalize the network effect with the access fee. In a mixed duopolistic
environment, the structure of access fees is determined by two factors based on the authors’
findings: how changes in the number of developers affect investment in an open-source
platform, and how investing in an open-source platform affects the private platform’s
revenues. An interesting conclusion is that a proprietary platform can also benefit from
investing in an open-source platform, as the quality of the platform improves developer
revenues, resulting in more applications in the market. This in turn increases the revenue
of the platform.
In connection with the above papers, the rest of the chapter will focus on mixed
duopolistic two-sided markets. In subchapter 4.2, the “zero” duopolist case of González-
Maestre and Martínez-Sánchez (2015) is analyzed in a different approach. This is because
the idea behind the model is that the state broadcaster chooses the level of advertising to
be zero, i.e. it excludes the advertiser side from the given platform. And if the advertisers
do not have access to the product or service of the state-owned company, the state-owned
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company will cease to be a platform but it will continue to compete with a private platform
in that market. The effect of this on pricing and product differentiation is the subject of
this study.
4.2 The model of competition between a public com-
pany and a private platform
Consider a classic Hotelling market. Let us suppose there is a state-owned company (s)
and a privately-owned platform (p) operating in the market. The two companies are
located along the section, namely that the public company can be characterized by the
ls location, while the private platform can be characterized by the lp location. Regarding
the locations, it is assumed that the private platform either chooses the same location
as the state-owned company or is located to the right of the state-owned company, i.e.,
ls ≤ lp. A potential situation is illustrated in Figure 4.2.1.





There are two types of consumer groups that can enter the market, viewers (v), and
advertisers (a). Only viewers can buy from the public company, while members of both
segments can enter the private platform, where they can then interact with each other. It
is assumed that the members of the two consumer groups are evenly distributed over the
unit section representing the market. For simplicity, it is assumed that both the public
company and the private platform produce their product at zero cost.
That is, it is assumed that viewers either buy a product from only one company or,
if it is in their interest, purchase both products. Because advertisers only have access to
a privately-owned platform, they can choose between entry and absence.
Viewers realize a benefit of the size of vv when they buy a company’s product. vv
is assumed to be at least large enough for all viewers to purchase a product from at least
one company. In the case of the state-owned company, it is assumed that viewers receive
the product for free (pv,s = 0) while joining the private platform has a non-negative price
(pi,p, where i = v, a) for viewers and advertisers.
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In addition to the connection fee, a further reduction in utility for viewers is caused
by the fact that the company’s product differs from the one they prefer, which preference
is embodied in the location of the viewers. The extent of this reduction in utility is given
by the transportation cost given as a linear function of the distance between the location
of the viewer and the company. More specifically, a viewer at a distance x who buys a
product from company j suffers a reduction in utility ti,jx. The transportation cost for
viewers is assumed to be tv,j ≥ 0 for every j = s, p, while the transportation cost for the
advertiser side is constant 1.
According to the literature on two-sided markets, it is assumed that consumers who
connect to the privately-owned platform realize additional benefits when interacting with
members of the other side, i.e. there is a network effect between the two segments. The
magnitude of this, if the number of −i-type consumers connected to platform p is denoted
by n−i,p, is bin−i,p.
Based on the above, the utility function of the viewer at point xv purchasing the
product of the state-owned company can be given by
uv,s = vv − tv,s |xv − ls| (4.2.1)
while the utility function of the viewer connecting to the private platform is as follows:
uv,p = vv − pv,2 − tv,p |lp − xv|+ bvna,p. (4.2.2)
Viewers who buy the products of both companies realize the utility of
uv,s,p = vv − tv,s |xv − ls|+ vv − pv,p − tv,p |lp − xv|+ bvna,p. (4.2.3)
The utility function of advertisers who enter the private platform:
ua,p = banv,p − pa,p − |lp − xa| . (4.2.4)




pi,pDi,p (p) , (4.2.5)
where Di,p (p) is the demand of type i consumer for the platform as a function of
p = (pv,p, pa,p), i.e. the vector of prices determined by the private platform.
In the operation of the state-owned company, it maximizes the surpluses for viewers
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• xv,s is the location of the viewer who is indifferent to purchasing the product of the
public company or both companies,
• xv,p is the location of the viewer who is indifferent to purchasing the product of the
private platform or both companies,
• xa is the location of the advertiser who is indifferent to joining and staying away
from the private platform.
In the following, a two-period game is examined. The game is as follows: In the
first period, the state-owned company and the private platform simultaneously decide on
their location, i.e. the differentiation of their product. In the second period, the private
platform sets the subscription fees for the two segments. Finally, the players on both
sides decide on the entrance, observing the degree of product differentiation chosen by
the companies and the prices charged by the private platform.
The solution to the game is given by its subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, which
can be obtained by backward induction due to the sequential nature of the game.
Consider the second period. Let us suppose the state-owned company chose ls, while
the private platform chose lp location in the previous period. The private platform set
pv,p for viewers and pa,p non-negative price for advertisers. To specify demand on the
viewer side, the location of viewers who are indifferent to whether they buy the product
of only one company or the product of both companies is needed to determine. In the
case of advertisers, the location of the advertiser who is indifferent to joining the private
platform and staying away from the market is needed to determine.
Consider first the case of viewers, i.e. the v segment. A viewer in location x who
is satisfied that x ≤ xv,s buys exclusively the product of a public company, while a
viewer who has xv,p ≤ x location, buys only the product of the private platform. Type
v consumers with location xv,s ≤ x ≤ xv,p purchase the products of both companies. For
the location of indifferent viewers, the values of utility functions given by the terms (4.2.1)
and (4.2.3), as well as the values of utility functions given by the terms (4.2.2) and (4.2.3),
are the same. Note that in equilibrium, the number of viewers connected to the private
platform (nv,p) will be 1− xv,s, while the number of advertisers (na,p) will be 1− xa.
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Based on the above, the indifferent viewer with respect to buying from a state-owned
company and multi-homing behavior is at
xv,s =
bv + bvba − bvlp − pv,p − bvpa,p − lptv,p + vv
bvba − tv,p
. (4.2.7)
The indifferent viewer regarding connection to the private platform and multi-homing can






For advertisers, to determine demand, the advertiser is looked for in a location that
is indifferent to entering the private platform, i.e., whose utility in (4.2.4) will be 0. From
this, it follows that the indifferent advertiser will be located at
xa = lp + pa,p + baxv,s − ba. (4.2.9)
Figure 4.2.2 illustrates the situation of indifferent viewers and advertisers, as well
as the demand for companies’ products.
Figure 4.2.2: The location of indifferent consumers and the demand for companies’
products
0 ls xv,s xv,p lp 1
Viewer side:
0 xa lp 1
Advertiser side:
Demand for the private platform on the viewer side will therefore be (1− xv,s).
Substituting the location of the indifferent viewer results in
Dv,p (p) =
pv,p + bv (lp − 1 + pa,p) + (lp − 1) tv,p − vv
bvba − tv,p
. (4.2.10)
The demand on the advertiser side will be (1− xa), based on which the demand function
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can be written in the form
Da,p (p) =
(lp − 1 + pa,p) tv,p + ba (pv,p + (lp − 1) tv,p − vv)
bvba − tv,p
. (4.2.11)
Using the demand functions (4.2.10) and (4.2.11), the profit function of the platform
given in (4.2.5) can be given as follows:
πp = pv,pDv,p (p) + pa,pDa,p (p) (4.2.12)




= 0, ∀i = v, a. (4.2.13)
From the solution of the system of equations formed by the first-order conditions,
it follows that the prices determined by the private platform will be in equilibrium
pv,p =
(1− lp) (bv (ba − 1) + ba + b2a − 2tv,p) tv,p + (ba (bv + ba)− 2tv,p) vv




(1− lp) (b2v − (2 + ba) tv,p + bv (ba + tv,p)) + (bv − ba) vv
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
. (4.2.15)
In addition to the connection fees set for the two sides, the profit of the private
platform is as follows:
πp =
− (lp − 1)2 tv,p (1 + bv + ba + tv,p) + (lp − 1) (bv + ba + 2tv, p) vv − v2v
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
. (4.2.16)
Knowing the locations of the indifferent viewers and advertiser in equation (4.2.7)
to equation (4.2.9) and the equilibrium prices specified in equation (4.2.14) and equation
(4.2.15), the objective function of the state-owned enterprise can also be determined on
the basis of expression (4.2.6), which takes the form:
W = 12
−l2stv,s + tv,p ((lp − 1) (bv + b2v + ba + 2bvba + b2a − 2tv,p)− 2vv)2(




+ (lp − 1) tv,p (− (lp − 1) (3b
2
v + ba (2 + 3ba) + bv (2 + 6ba)− 8tv,p) + 4vv)





(bv + ba)2 + (bv − 2 + ba) tv,p
)
− (bv + ba) vv
)2
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−3 (bv + ba)2 − 2 (bv + ba − 4) tv,p
)
+ 2 (bv + ba) vv
)
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
 . (4.2.17)
Let us now turn to the examination of the first period and consider the location
decision of the public company and the private platform, i.e. the degree of product
differentiation chosen by them. The state-owned firm determines its location so that the
viewer and advertiser surplus given in (4.2.17) is maximal. And the private platform seeks
to maximize its profit function as defined in (4.2.16). It follows from the two optimizations





location decision in equilibrium, while the location chosen by the private platform in
equilibrium would be
lp = 1 +
(bv + ba + 2tv,p) vv
2tv,p (1 + bv + ba + tv,p)
. (4.2.19)
However, since the location must be lp ≤ 1, the privately-owned platform will be located
on the right edge of the section, i.e.
l∗p = 1
will be in equilibrium. It can be seen that the location chosen by the private platform is
not affected by the location decision of the state-owned company.
Knowing the above location decisions, the equilibrium output of the game can
already be determined, which is summarized in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. In a duopolistic market where a public company and a private platform
compete, viewers can exhibit single-homing and multi-homing behavior, while on the adver-
tisers’ side the market is not fully covered, the following equilibrium emerges: the private





location. Viewers will pay a price of
p∗v,p =
(ba (bv + ba)− 2tv,p) vv
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
(4.2.21)
for the product of the private platform, while the price charged to advertisers will be
p∗a,p =
(bv − ba) vv
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
. (4.2.22)
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At these prices, the private platform makes a profit of
π∗p = −
v2v
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
. (4.2.23)
The surplus for viewers and advertisers will be
W ∗ = 12
 2
tv,s
+ (bv + ba)
2 + 4tv,p(
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
)2
 v2v . (4.2.24)










will buy the products of both companies, while on the advertiser side, the indifferent player
will be located at point
x∗a = 1 +
(bv + ba) vv
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
. (4.2.26)
Equation (4.2.23) shows that the profit realized by the private platform will be
positive only if the condition (bv + ba)2−4tv,p < 0 is satisfied. In this case, it follows from
(4.2.22) that bv < ba, otherwise the price charged to advertisers would be negative. Since
advertisers can only meet viewers here, the platform has a monopolistic power over the
viewers connected to it, so it is a rational assumption that it sets a positive price for the
advertisers that join it.
The price charged to viewers is also non-negative. As the network effect generated
by viewers on the advertisers’ side increases, i.e. ba → 1, the connection fee imposed




platform allows viewers to enter for free, as does the public company. That is, although
the decision of the state-owned company to differentiate the product does not affect the
level of product differentiation chosen by the private platform, the competition on the
viewer side is reflected in the prices.
The social surplus in (4.2.24) will be positive for all rational parameter values.
To illustrate the above, consider two numerical examples. Suppose viewers do not
like ads (bv = −12), while advertisers benefit from viewers their ad reaches (ba = 1). For
viewers, buying a company’s product generates 1 unit of benefit (vv = 1).






For viewers, the privately-owned platform sets a price of
pv,p =
0.5 (tv,p − 0.25)
tv,p − 0.0625
,
































Now consider the case where viewers entering a private platform can benefit from
being able to transact with as many advertisers as possible (bv = 12). And the network
effect on the advertiser side should be strong (ba = 34). The value of the direct utility is
unchanged compared to the previous example.




location decision. In this case, viewers will pay a price of
pv,p =
0.5 (tv,p − 0.4688)
tv,p − 0.3906
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Following the examples, let us look at how changes in each parameter affect the equilibrium.
The connection fees charged to viewers and advertisers, the location of the first
viewer deciding on multi-homing, the location of the advertiser deciding on the connection,
and the profit of the privately-owned platform are influenced by the parameters represent-
ing network effects, by the transport cost in the case of connecting to the private platform
and by the parameter vv, which represents the benefit of owning the product of the private
platform. In addition to the parameters listed above, the objective function of the state-
owned company also depends on the transportation costs of viewers who purchase its
product. The location of the state-owned company and the location of the last viewer who
opts for multi-homing is determined by the transportation cost incurred when purchasing
the product of the state-owned company, as well as the benefits of owning the product.
Let us first look at what happens when the network effect on the advertiser side,
i.e. ba, starts to increase. The partial derivative of the connection fee charged to viewers
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bv (bv + ba)2 − 4batv,p
)
vv(
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
)2 < 0.
The above expression is negative due to the conditions (bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p < 0 and bv < ba,
i.e. as the price increases, the price tailored to viewers decreases. As it is more beneficial
for advertisers to interact with viewers, it is a rational decision for the platform to entice
viewers. As a result, demand on the side of advertisers increases, allowing the private
platform to achieve higher profits by setting a higher price for the advertisers. This
is also supported by the partial derivative of the connection fee of the advertisers with
respect to the network effect on their side, which results in
∂pa,p
∂ba
= (4tv,p − (3bv − ba) (bv + ba)) vv(
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
)2 > 0.
The above expression is positive due to the (bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p < 0 and bv < ba conditions,
i.e., the greater the benefit to advertisers from interactions with members of the other
segment, the higher the price the platform charges them. The private platform can do
this as the willingness of the advertiser segment to pay increases as the network effect
strengthens.
As the connection fee tailored to viewers decreases, the number of viewers opting
for multi-homing will also increase. Examining the boundaries of the interval given in
(4.2.25), it can be seen that the location of the last multi-homing viewer is not affected
by the growth of ba, but that of the first one is. For the partial derivative with respect to
ba, it follows that
∂xv,s
∂ba
= − 4 (bv + ba) vv(
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
)2 < 0,
i.e. the location of the indifferent viewer, gets closer and closer to the left edge of the
section. The same is true on the advertiser side. Deriving the location of the advertiser,
which is indifferent between the connection and the absence, with respect to the parameter





(bv + ba)2 + 4tv,p
)
vv(
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
)2 < 0.
Although the platform will increase the price tailored to advertisers, as the number of
viewers increases, so will the willingness of advertisers to join as they gain greater utility.
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Although the connection fee of viewers will decrease, the profit realized by the
platform will increase as the connection fee of the advertisers, as well as the number of
viewers and advertisers connected to the platform increases, as a result of the strengthening
network effect on the advertiser side. The partial derivative of the profit function given
in (4.2.23) with respect to ba will be as follows:
∂πp
∂ba
= 2 (ba + bv) v
2
v(
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
)2 > 0
In the case of the surplus realized by viewers and advertisers, the following partial






(bv + ba)2 + 12tv,p
)
v2v(
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
)3 > 0.
It was previously assumed that (bv + ba)2−4tv,p < 0, based on which it can be stated that
with the increase of the network effect realized by the advertisers, the surplus realized by
the viewers and the advertisers will also increase.
The next case which is needed to look at is what happens when the network effect
starts to intensify on the other side, i.e. the viewer side. Deriving the connection fee






ba (bv + ba)2 − 4bvtv,p
)
vv(
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
)2
is obtained. Its value is determined by the magnitude of tv,p: if
tv,p >
ba (bv + ba)2
4bv
,
the increase in bv raises the price tailored to viewers.
If the network benefits realized by viewers change, the change in the price charged
to advertisers is shown by the following term:
∂pa,p
∂bv
= −((bv − 3ba) (bv + ba) + 4tv,p) vv(
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
)2 < 0.
It was assumed beforehand, that the (bv + ba)2−4tv,p < 0 condition holds. Based on this,
if the network benefit realized by the viewers increases, the price charged to the advertisers
decreases. This is in line with what has been established for changes in viewers’ connection
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fees.
If viewers’ utility is increased by the transactions with advertisers, more and more
viewers will choose to join the platform, meaning the number of viewers opting for multi-
homing will increase. Examining (4.2.25) again, it can be seen that this will affect the
location of the first viewer to choose multi-homing as follows:
∂xv,s
∂bv
= − 4 (bv + ba) vv(
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
)2 < 0.
Thus, as the network benefit realized on the viewer side increases, the location of the
first viewer who opts for multi-homing is getting closer and closer to the left edge of
the section. Based on this, the number of viewers connecting to the private platform
will increase, which will also increase the willingness of advertisers to connect. If it is
examined how the location of the indifferent advertiser is affected by the increase of bv,





(bv + ba)2 + 4tv,p
)
vv(
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
)2 < 0,
i.e. the location of the indifferent advertiser, also gets closer and closer to the left edge of
the section.
The profit realized by the private platform as well as the surplus realized by the
consumers, similarly to the previous case, will increase here as the network benefit of the
viewers increases.5
Let us now examine how the increase in transportation cost on the viewer side
affects the equilibrium described above. If the transportation cost incurred during the
connection to the state-owned company increase, the location of the private platform and
the connection fees, the location of the first viewer choosing multi-homing, the location
of the indifferent advertiser, and the realized profit of the platform will not change. On
the other hand, the location of the state-owned company will be affected. Deriving the







The above expression represents a negative value, i.e. the increase of tv,s shifts the location
chosen by the state-owned company to the left. In other words, the state-owned company
differentiates its product more, when the transport cost occurring when viewers joining
5The profit function of the platform and the objective function of the state-owned enterprise are
symmetric for the parameters embodying the network effect, hence their partial derivative is the same.
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to it increases.
The number of viewers opting for multi-homing will decrease with increasing trans-
portation cost. Looking more closely at (4.2.25), it can be seen that the location of the
viewer who is indifferent between multi-homing and connection to the private platform is






i.e. more and more viewers decide to buy only the product of the platform. This is the
reason why the profit of the platform is not affected by the size of tv,s, as in its case the
number of subscribed viewers does not change, there is only a rearrangement with respect
to the multi-homing and exclusively connected viewers.
In the case of surpluses realized by viewers and advertisers, the following expression








Thus, the increase in transportation cost incurred in joining the state-owned company
reduces the amount of surplus that can be realized by viewers and advertisers.
If the transportation costs incurred by viewers due to connecting to the private
platform increase, the location decision of the state-owned company and the private
platform would not change. The partial derivative of the price tailored to viewers with





a − b2v) vv(
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
)2 .
It can be stated that the effect of the change in transportation cost in terms of the
connection fee charged to viewers varies depending on the network effect on viewers. If
the network effect on the viewers side is negative and the condition bv < −ba holds, then
the increase in viewers’ transportation costs will reduce the connection fee charged to
them. If −ba ≤ bv < ba, the change in transportation cost increases their connection fee.
The partial derivative of the connection fee set for advertisers with respect to tv,p
takes the form of
∂pa,p
∂tv,p
= 4 (bv − ba) vv(
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
)2 < 0.
As it was assumed, bv < ba should hold which means that an increase in viewers’
transportation cost will reduce the price charged to the advertiser side.
On the viewer side, the number of those opting for multi-homing is affected by
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the increase in transportation cost incurred when connecting to the private platform,
according to term (4.2.25). The partial derivative of the location of the first indifferent




(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
)2 > 0.
As the tv,p increases, the location of the first indifferent viewer shifts to the right. Based
on these, the higher the transportation cost for viewers, the more they decide to buy
exclusively the product of the state-owned company. Examining the indifferent advertiser,
a similar finding can be made. The derivative of the indifferent advertiser’s location with
respect to tv,p will be
∂xa
∂tv,p
= 4 (bv + ba) vv(
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
)2 > 0,
i.e. the willingness to enter will also decrease on the advertiser side. The reason behind
this is that the decline in the number of viewers reduces the demand of advertisers for the
platform, which cannot be completely compensate with the decrease in the connection
fee.
As a result of the above, the profit that can be realized by the platform will also






(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
)2 < 0.







3 (bv + ba)2 + 4tv,p
)
v2v(
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
)3 < 0
The numerator is positive, while the denominator is negative due to (bv + ba)2 −
4tv,p < 0, so the value of the fraction is negative overall. Based on these, as the
transportation cost incurred when connecting to the private platform increases, the surplus
that can be realized by consumers will decrease.
The last case to be examined is when the benefit to viewers from owning a product
of the public company and/or the private platform, i.e. vv, increases. Then, deriving the
location decision of the state-owned company with respect to the parameter representing
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The value of the derivative is positive, i.e. as the benefit from owning the product of the
public company and/or the private platform increases, the location of the state-owned
company shifts to the right. So in this case, the state-owned company makes its product
less differentiated.
Deriving the connection fee charged to viewers by the private platform with respect
to the benefits realized by them, it follows that
∂pv,p
∂vv
= ba (bv + ba)− 2tv,p
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
.
Since it was previously assumed that (bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p < 0, the denominator is negative.
The value of the above expression is positive if the condition tv,p > ba(bv+ba)2 holds. That
is, if the transport cost occurring when viewers join the private platform is negligible, the
fee charged to viewers decreases as the benefits of owning the product increase. While
if the transportation cost is high, the platform will increase the price charged to them.
As viewers value the platform’s product more and more, they are more and more willing
to pay for it so it is a rational decision for the platform to increase the price charged to
them.
The partial derivative of the price tailored to advertisers with respect to vv will be
∂pa,p
∂vv
= bv − ba
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
> 0.
Based on the conditions bv < ba and (bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p < 0, the above expression will
be positive, i.e. the more viewers value the platform’s product, the higher the price the
platform sets for advertisers. This is because as more and more viewers join the platform,
advertisers will be more willing to enter and pay a higher price.
Following the above line of reasoning, the location of the viewers is examined who
choose multi-homing and the indifferent member of the advertiser side. Deriving (4.2.25)













while deriving (4.2.26) will be
∂xa
∂vv
= bv + ba
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
< 0.
That is, the number of viewers opting for multi-homing will indeed increase, as the location
of the first viewer who buys the products of both companies will be closer to the left edge
of the section, while the last one will be closer to the right edge. And the location of the
advertiser that is indifferent to joining and staying away is getting closer and closer to
the left edge of the section, meaning more and more advertisers will be present on the
platform.




(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
> 0.
As viewers value the platform’s product more and more, more people are choosing to join,
causing more advertisers to enter the platform. In addition, the platform will have the
opportunity to charge a higher price to advertisers – and in some cases to viewers – so
that its realizable profit will increase.







+ (bv + ba)
2 + 4tv,p(
(bv + ba)2 − 4tv,p
)2
 vv > 0.
That is, if viewers value the product of the state-owned company and/or the platform
more and more, the surplus realized by them and by the advertisers will increase.
Table 4.1: Comparative statistics – Summary table
ls pv,p pa,p xv,s xv,p xa π W




- - 0 - + +








+ - + - + +
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4.2.2 Summary
In this chapter, a model was presented where a private platform competed for viewers
with a public company. The justification for the model is given by the efforts in the
European Union to ensure that public service broadcasters do not cover their operations
from the proceeds of advertising. This intervention was analyzed by González-Maestre
and Martínez-Sánchez (2015) in a “zero” duopolistic model framework, where the state
set the level of advertising at zero. However, this has excluded the advertiser side from
that platform. And if the advertisers do not have access to the product or service of the
state-owned company, the state-owned company will cease to be a platform but it will
continue to compete with a private platform in that market.
Therefore, the question of how competition between the two service providers affects
their pricing and their decision to differentiate their products was examined. That is,
what effect does it have if the public platform ceases to exist and continues to compete
as a public company with a privately-owned platform. The product differentiation was
captured in the usual way in the literature, by determining the location.
The conclusion was reached that the location decision of either service provider is
not influenced by the location chosen by the other: that is, their decision to differentiate
the product is not influenced by the competitor’s decision. Because advertisers can only
interact with viewers on the platform, in their case, the company sets a positive price
because it has a monopolistic power over the viewers that join it. On the other hand, it
imposes a low price on viewers in order to attract as many of them as possible and thus
increase its ability to generate profit on the other side’s players. The stronger the network
effect viewers generate on the advertiser side, the lower the price they have to pay to join.
These results are in line with the literature on two-sided markets. Furthermore, it was
illustrated that although product differentiation is not affected by competition between
the two companies on the viewer side, it does reduce the price charged to viewers.
Overall, therefore, with the abolition of the state platform, the strategy of regulation
of entry loses its strength in two-sided markets. So, if the state wants to take action against
a private platform to represent the interests of consumers, it either uses other tools of
regulation (taxation, price regulation, competition law) or creates a public platform in
the given market that forces the private company to compete.
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Summary
In the dissertation, the research focused on issues related to two-sided markets, which
have not yet been examined in the literature or in a form different from that presented
here.
In the chapter on product differentiation (Chapter 2), the question was examined
of how the price of a platform’s product or service is affected by the fact that it provides
consumers with the opportunity to consume it to a limited or fully personalized extent.
The hypothesis was that the more a product can be customized, the lower will be the
transportation cost on the consumer side and the higher will be the price the platform
will charge for it. The results supported this hypothesis, as in equilibrium, the platforms
charged a positive price for full customization, while when product differentiation was
limited, they provided it for free. This conclusion is supported by several practical
examples. The free and paid versions of anti-virus software were mentioned in the
dissertation as an example. The above result is also interesting because, in the case
of traditional markets, the literature has shown just the opposite: there, companies are
encouraged to reduce the differentiation of their products. Thus, it has been shown that
in the case of two-sided markets, it is not necessarily a concern that a platform has a large
market share in one segment. If it has to compete for subscribers on the other side, this
competition will automatically spread to the other consumer group, and if not in terms
of prices, but in other dimensions, the effect can be traced.
In the model for analyzing public and private contracts, discussed in Chapter 3,
the incentives of platforms were examined to use public and private contract and the
impact of contracts on pricing. In addition to public contracts, platforms and consumers
preferred sellers to be present on both platforms. It has been shown that in addition
to the use of private contracts, in the case of duopolistic platforms, platforms change
their pricing strategy on the sellers’ side and set a positive franchise fee for the previously
subsidized segment. This is in accordance with the literature. However, on the consumers’
side, the platforms do not offer subsidies, they continue to set a positive subscription
fee. Comparing the two relevant models, it was highlighted that platforms are typically
encouraged to use public contracts. Although there are many examples of private contracts
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in practice, it was argued that this is much more for the purpose of product differentiation
and increasing market power. Public contracts are designed by platforms in such a way
as to attract as many sellers as possible, as this is the only way they can reap the benefits
of the network effect in the market. On the consumer side, on the other hand, the type
of network effect, the size of the transportation cost, and the relationship between the
products manufactured on the platforms determined which type of contract can generate
the largest surplus for them.
Finally, in the last chapter, the impact on pricing and product differentiation of the
endeavor in the European Union was examined which aims to ban advertising funding
from public service broadcasters. It was argued that this will reclassify the state platform
as a state-owned company as the advertiser side will be banned from entering. The results
revealed that none of the service providers’ product differentiation decisions are influenced
by the competitor’s decision. Because advertisers can only interact with viewers on the
platform, and the platform has the opportunity to charge them a high price, due to its
monopoly over the viewer side. On the viewer side, on the other hand, it is forced to set
a low price to exploit the network effect on the market, and as a result of a competitor
providing free services. Overall, however, it has been shown that if one side is banned
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Subsection 3.3.3: Comparison of public contract models
Figure 4.2.3: Evolution of platforms’ profit as a function of the network effect and the
travel cost for complementary products
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Figure 4.2.4: Evolution of platforms’ profit as a function of the network effect and the
travel cost for independent products
Figure 4.2.5: Evolution of platforms’ profit as a function of the network effect and the
travel cost for substitute products
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Figure 4.2.6: Evolution of consumer surplus as a function of the network effect and the
travel cost for complementary products
Figure 4.2.7: Evolution of consumer surplus as a function of the network effect and the
travel cost for independent products
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Figure 4.2.8: Evolution of consumer surplus as a function of the network effect and the
travel cost for substitute products
Section 3.5: Comparison of public and private contract models
Figure 4.2.9: Evolution of the demand for platform-specific products as a function of the
network effect for complementary products
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Figure 4.2.10: Evolution of the demand for platform-specific products as a function of
the network effect for independent products
Figure 4.2.11: Evolution of the demand for platform-specific products as a function of
the network effect for substitute products
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Figure 4.2.12: Evolution of the subscription fee as a function of the network effect for
complementary products
Figure 4.2.13: Evolution of the subscription fee as a function of the network effect for
independent products
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Figure 4.2.14: Evolution of the subscription fee as a function of the network effect for
substitute products
Figure 4.2.15: Evolution of platforms’ profit as a function of the network effect and the
travel cost for complementary products
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Figure 4.2.16: Evolution of platforms’ profit as a function of the network effect and the
travel cost for independent products
Figure 4.2.17: Evolution of platforms’ profit as a function of the network effect and the
travel cost for substitute products
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Figure 4.2.18: Evolution of consumer surplus as a function of the network effect and the
travel cost for complementary products
Figure 4.2.19: Evolution of consumer surplus as a function of the network effect and the
travel cost for independent products
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Figure 4.2.20: Evolution of consumer surplus as a function of the network effect and the
travel cost for substitute products
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